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CHECKS AND BALANCES IN WARTIME: 
AMERICAN, BRITISH AND ISRAELI 
EXPERIENCES 
Stephen J. Schulhofer * 
Three years after an attack that traumatized the nation and 
prompted massive military and law-enforcement counter-measures, 
we continue to wrestle with the central dilemma of the rule of law. 
Which is more to be feared - the danger of unchecked executive and 
military power, or the danger of terrorist attacks that only an 
unconstrained executive could prevent? 
Posed in varying configurations, the question has already 
generated extensive litigation since September 11 ,  2001 , and a dozen 
major appellate rulings.1 Last Term's Supreme Court trilogy - Rasul 
v. Bush, 2 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld3 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla4 - clarified 
several important points but deferred decision on most of the 
significant issues. Ever cautious and understandably daunted, the 
Court avoided grappling in any final way with the underlying problem 
of reconciling the benefits and dangers of constraints on executive 
power. The problem, of course, is inherent in government itself. But in 
* Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1964, Princeton; 
LL.B. 1967, Harvard. - Ed. 
T his essay is written to honor t he achievement s  and contribut ions of an ext raordinary 
t eacher and colleague, Professor Yale Kamisar. For forty-seven years - almost half a 
centu ry! - Professor Kamisar has been an eloquent voice for t ruth and fairness in American 
criminal ju st ice. He has inspired, and infu sed with hi s passion, several generations of 
stu dents, pract icing lawyers, ju dges and scholars. Long before we met , I was indebt ed to his 
penet rat ing scholarship, and for me, as for cou nt less other academics, he has been an always­
generou s  and t houghtfu l  teacher. His inst ru mental role in paving t he way for Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), one of t he most significant landmark s  in American legal 
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decisions reviewed t herein, see, for example, United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4th 
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Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Su rveillance Cou rt of Review 2002); New 
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a national emergency it arises in less familiar settings, with much 
higher stakes and more difficult choices that will bedevil us, m 
changing forms, as long as the "war on terrorism" continues. 
Beyond the legal specifics of last Term's trilogy (questions of 
jurisdiction, venue, the reach of prior holdings and the meaning of key 
statutory phrases), the cases presented a wide range of operational 
questions. Does the President, acting as Commander in Chief, have 
the right to hold suspected enemy fighters indefinitely, without 
providing them any sort of trial? Should he be able to block their 
access to lawyers, family and friends for lengthy periods, in order to 
facilitate effective interrogation? If hearings or trials are required, 
how promptly must they be held? Can the President choose to provide 
hearings, but only before military commissions subordinate to his 
authority? Can the public and even the defendants themselves be 
denied access to crucial but sensitive evidence that military or civilian 
judges will consider? If such Presidential powers exist, is Congress 
barred from limiting their exercise? Can Congress and the press be 
denied access to information about how the Presidential war powers 
are exercised? 
The Court seemed to answer the first question in the negative, but 
the Administration continues to dispute this most elementary point.5 
And even if the Court did mean what it explicitly said - that some 
kind of hearing is required6 - it left every one of the remaining 
questions wide open. To resolve them, of course, will require attention 
to many legal particulars. But all the questions pose a common 
normative problem - whether the need to protect public safety and 
national security in a time of crisis justifies restrictions on liberty that 
we would not impose under ordinary circumstances. Setting aside the 
appropriate, but ultimately unsatisfying debate over the true meaning 
of statutes and precedents, is there any way to resolve this 
foundational issue as a matter of first principles? 
After September 11 ,  2001, many said that executive abuse was far 
less likely and less harmful than a devastating attack that unhampered 
executive officials could prevent. Others said, with equal confidence, 
that unchecked executive power is always too dangerous, and is 
inefficient to boot. It seems unlikely that either of these categorical 
answers could be correct. The dangers of an insufficiently constrained 
5. See Lyle Denniston, The Incredible Shrinking Rasul Decision, (July 31, 2004), at 
http://www.goldsteinhowe.com/blog/archive/2004_ 07 _ 25_ SCOTUSblog.cfm; Neil A. Lewis, 
New Fight On Guantanamo Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at Al8. 
6. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-49 (plurality opinion) (discussing hearing rights of U.S. 
citizens); cf Rasul, 124 U.S. at 2698 n. 15 (noting for non-citizens that their allegatio ns 
"unquestionably" describe custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the 
United States and therefore, if true, would unquestionably entitle them to release). 
1908 Michigan Law Review (Vol . 102:1906 
executive and the dangers of an overly constrained executive are both 
real. A central constitutional issue of our time will be to determine 
which is the more serious - and when. 
America's past experience in wartime provides one relevant 
benchmark. But it cannot be decisive in itself. Fighting terrorism poses 
challenges that are essentially new (or newly recognized) for America. 
For that reason, it is worth considering the experience of Western 
democracies that confronted grave terrorist threats over extended 
periods before September 11, 2001. The focus of this Article, 
therefore, is an examination of the extent to which two of these 
nations, Britain and Israel, relaxed their own rule-of-law norms in 
order to battle terrorism effectively during periods of grave danger. It 
goes without saying that crisis situations abroad, such as the violence 
Britain faced in Northern Ireland, are not in all respects comparable 
to the terrorist threat America faces today. And the value judgments 
and compromises struck in other nations, even in comparable 
situations, are not necessarily right for the United States. But the 
British and Israeli situations, both extending over several decades, 
offer two of the few available sources of recent experience in 
attempting to reconcile the demands of national survival and the rule 
of law in the context of an unremitting terrorist threat. 
Part I of this Article summarizes recent Administration assertions 
of executive detention power and the arguments advanced in support 
of them. Part II briefly outlines the history of executive detention in 
previous American wars and the often-overlooked pattern of judicial 
insistence on preserving rule-of-law norms. Part III examines British 
and Israeli efforts to reconcile those norms with a persistent terrorist 
threat. 
The conclusions, summarized in Part IV, indicate that in both 
Britain and Israel, executive and military authorities claimed 
extraordinary powers and sought to dilute normal judicial checks. In 
both nations, such measures provoked controversy, and other 
branches reined them in to some extent. In these respects the foreign 
experience mirrors that of the United States over the past three years. 
There is, however, a dramatic difference in the degree to which 
adjustments were made. In the current American "war on terrorism,'' 
the Administration has - with considerable support in the courts and 
even more in public opinion - held suspected terrorists 
incommunicado for several years, on nothing more than a unilateral 
Presidential determination of their involvement. The recent Supreme 
Court decisions, while refusing to condone unlimited Presidential 
power, set few clear boundaries. In one of the three cases (Hamdi), 
the Court held only that after more than two years, there was no 
longer sufficient justification for continued incommunicado detention; 
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it found no need to specify whether the rights to counsel and a hearing 
kick in at any earlier point.7 In the other two cases, the Court left 
general principles even less specific. And despite encouraging rhetoric, 
the Court gave no immediate relief to any of the individual 
petitioners; their two-year-plus detentions were left undisturbed, and 
the government insists that even now, most of them have no right of 
access to counsel.8 
The counter-terrorism adjustments sought and accepted in other 
countries differ by many large orders of magnitude. In Northern 
Ireland, beginning in the early 1970s, rival Catholic and Protestant 
militants resorted to increasingly lethal bombings and shootings in an 
effort to terrorize opposing communities; as Britain struggled to cope 
with a staggering death toll among security forces and civilians, 
ordinary time limits for bringing detainees to court, varying from 
twenty-four to thirty-six hours, were extended to seven days. Israel has 
for years confronted persistent suicide bombings and other terror 
attacks that its citizens consider a grave threat to national survival; in 
response, Israel raised its normal time limit prior to judicial review of 
detention from twenty-four hours to forty-eight hours for suspected 
terrorists seized within Israel itself, and to eighteen days for unlawful 
combatants captured in territories under military occupation. These 
measures, though modest (and arguably trivial) compared to those 
now imposed in the United States, were nonetheless perceived as 
draconian. Courts insisted that they be scaled back. In Israel, periods 
exceeding eight days for combatants seized in occupied territories 
were held to be an unacceptable impairment of the rule of law. In 
Britain, detention up to a maximum of seven days was allowed only 
with assurance that incommunicado conditions would end after forty­
eight hours. 
Access to counsel was likewise modified, but in ways that again 
seem almost trivial in comparison to American practice post­
September 11th. In Britain, access to counsel in terrorism cases was 
restricted during the first forty-eight hours of detention, but 
restrictions were subject to judicial review, and there was (and is) an 
absolute, judicially enforceable right to consult a solicitor after the 
forty-eight hour point. In Israel, access to counsel (normally 
immediate) can be deferred in terrorism investigations for up to 
7. See Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2652 (plurality opinion). Indeed, a grudging reading of Hamdi 
would leave room for the government to argue that incommunicado detention exceeding 
two years might sometimes be permissible, depending on all the circumstances. 
8. Since July 2004, the government has all owed Padilla to have unmonitored meetings 
with his attorneys. T elephone interview with Andrew Patel, counsel to Padilla, Sept. 28, 
2004. 
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twenty-one days, but only with judicial approval and with some 
detainee access to family and other outside contact in the interim. 
Beyond imposing these basic checks, courts abroad have addressed 
many of the difficult practical details that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
yet to confront. Both the British and Israeli terrorism crises required 
courts to decide how much allowance to make for the need - as part 
of effective intelligence gathering - for isolation and extended 
interrogation of terror suspects. In both situations courts assessed the 
procedural safeguards, structural independence, and limits on 
confidentiality appropriate in judicial review of detention decisions. 
They examined the safeguards necessary to prevent abuse of terror 
suspects in custody and the leeway warranted in light of legitimate 
national-security concerns. Israeli courts have considered the impact 
of logistics and administrative resources on the processing of enemy 
combatants seized in battle. Most fundamentally, both situations 
prompted extensive assessment of the nature of the judicial role and 
the appropriate mix of deference and scrutiny when courts face claims 
of military necessity in the context of the gravest threats to public 
safety and national survival. 
On all these matters, detailed below, courts abroad assumed a 
large role in reviewing, reassessing and restraining executive and 
military powers. 
These judgments by themselves cannot prove that greater 
executive power would have been ineffective or too dangerous. It is 
always possible that with more power, British and Israeli authorities 
would have prevented more terror attacks, just as it is possible that 
more power would have backfired in any number of ways. But in one 
important respect the British and Israeli experiences are 
unambiguous. They leave us with no illusion that powers currently 
claimed by the U.S. government are in any sense normal, even for a 
situation of national crisis. Those who urge extraordinary judicial 
deference to the Commander in Chief and a highly limited role for the 
courts bear the burden of explaining why we should reject wartime 
checks and balances that we ourselves, along with other Western 
democracies, have until now considered essential and entirely 
workable components of the rule of law. 
I .  EXECUT IVE DETE NT ION S INCE SE PTE MBE R  11,  2001 
The U.S. government has asserted broad powers of executive 
detention in three contexts. First are the hundreds of foreign nationals 
seized abroad and held outside U.S. borders. Second are the U.S. 
citizens seized abroad; the government held one of them (Yaser 
Hamdi) in military custody in the United States for more than two 
years without access to any court. Third are those arrested by law­
enforcement agents within the United States and subsequently 
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transferred to military custody. Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen suspected 
of plotting to detonate a bomb laced with radioactive material, was 
arrested at O'Hare Airport in May 2002 and originally held as a 
material witness. In June 2002, a day before his scheduled appearance 
in court, President Bush declared Padilla an "enemy combatant" and 
transferred him to the military, which has held him in a Navy brig ever 
since. Ali Saleh al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar lawfully studying in the 
United States, was arrested in Illinois in December 2002 and charged 
with lying to the FBI. Although the Speedy Trial Act9 required al 
Marri's trial to commence promptly after indictment, in June 2003 
President Bush designated al-Marri an enemy combatant, and he too 
was turned over to the military and moved to the same Navy brig. 
Though the legal arguments vary for the different groups of 
detainees, the government claimed the same powers in all three 
situations - the power to resolve factual questions and determine the 
person's status by Presidential order, based on intelligence reports, 
without any hearing or opportunity for the detainee to respond;10 the 
power to hold the person indefinitely, with the likelihood that in most 
cases this will mean detention for many years;11 the power to deny all 
access to counsel or the courts; and the power to deny the detainee 
any contact whatsoever with the outside world, for as long as the 
military, in its sole discretion, considers advisable.12 
Government arguments for its position are in part stated simply as 
a matter of power. The claim (much contested) is that prior precedent 
and the President's authority as Commander in Chief give the 
executive the right to take these steps when it judges proper, without 
need to answer to any other branch of government. The policy 
considerations advanced in support boil down to three problems 
allegedly entailed in any sort of outside involvement or adversary 
hearing. The potential need for testimony from combat commanders 
could, it is said, impede battlefield operations. The inevitable 
disclosure of information about the identity of detainees and the basis 
for the suspicions against them could, it is said, provide our enemies 
9. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-74 (2000). 
10. At oral argu ment in Hamdi, the government argu ed that the det ainee had the 
opportunit y  t o  respond to the allegat ions against him by t elling his side of the story to h is 
interrogator. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct . at 2651 (plu ralit y opinion), dismissing th at argu ment as 
fatu ou s  ("An interrogation by one's captor, however effect ive as an int elligence gathering 
t ool, hardly constitut es a const itut ionally adequ ate fact finding bef ore a neutral decision­
maker."). 
11. See, e.g. , Neil A. Lewis & Eric Sch mitt , Cuba Detentions May Last Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at Al. 
12. See Linda Greenhou se, Court Hears Case On U.S. Detainees, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2004, p. Al; Michael Killian & Lisa Anderson, U.S. To Let Padilla See Lawyer, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE Feb. 12, 2004, p. 1 .  
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with clues about intelligence methods and the direction of our 
counter-measures. Finally, questioning of suspected terrorists could, it 
is said, be impeded unless interrogators are able to keep suspects 
isolated and make clear to them that they remain completely 
dependent on their captors. 13  
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,14 the Court considered these claims in the 
context where they seem weakest - that of a U.S. citizen arrested 
within the United States and held in custody on American soil.15 Yet 
the Court, dividing 5-4, ordered that Padilla's habeas petition be 
dismissed. The majority expressed no view on the issues of 
presidential power or on what rights, if any, Padilla might have. It 
simply held that he had filed his petition in the wrong jurisdiction. 
After more than two years of detention, virtually all of it 
incommunicado, and after persistent, unsuccessful efforts to secure the 
rights to counsel and to a hearing on the allegations against him, 
Padilla obtained no relief whatever. He was told to start over again in 
another court. 
Rasul v. Bush,16 at the opposite pole, involved foreign nationals 
seized during combat operations in Afghanistan and held outside U.S. 
territory, at the Guantanamo Bay naval base. A World War II 
precedent, Johnson v. Eisentrager,17 which ruled that German 
nationals held in an American military prison in occupied Germany 
had no right to seek habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, posed 
an especially large obstacle to relief in Rasul. Nonetheless, the Court, 
dividing 6-3, found Eisentrager inapplicable and upheld the district 
court's jurisdiction to hear the foreigners' petitions. The Court did not, 
however, express any view on what proceedings, if any, would be 
appropriate on remand. 18 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,19 the detainee, also captured in 
Afghanistan, was a U.S. citizen now held in the United States, and 
jurisdiction was undisputed. Here a controlling plurality of the Court 
13. Decla ra tion of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby at 4, Pa dilla v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 
1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027). 
14. 124 s. Ct. 271 1  (2004). 
15. The Second Circuit ha d held  tha t Pa dilla wa s entitl ed to immedia te rel ease under 
the terms of the Anti-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 400l(a) (2000), which provides tha t "(n]o 
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise deta ined by the United Sta tes except pursuant to a n  
Act o f  Congress." 
16. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
17. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
18. "Whether a nd wha t further proceedings ma y become necessary a fter respondents 
ma ke their response to the merits of petitioners' cla ims a re ma tters tha t we need not a ddress 
now." Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699. 
19. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
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did reach the merits,20 and it settled three points. First, it upheld the 
President's power to hold for an extended period (at least until the 
end of active combat operations) the so-called enemy combatants -
those who have taken up arms against the United States and our 
allies.21 Second, rejecting the government's assertion that separation­
of-powers principles mandated a "heavily circumscribed role for the 
courts,"22 it held that a citizen classified as an enemy combatant has a 
constitutional right to a hearing before an independent tribunal to 
resolve any dispute about the facts allegedly supporting that 
designation.23 And third, without reaching Hamdi's complaints about 
earlier government actions denying him access to counsel, it held that 
" [h]e unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection 
with the proceedings on remand."24 
The list of issues the Court did not resolve is long: 
(1) Regarding those who are in fact enemy combatants, the Court 
did not decide what rights, if any, they might have while in 
confinement. 25 
(2) It did not decide whether enemy combatants could be confined 
indefinitely in the event that overseas military operations against 
terror networks take on a quasi-permanent character.26 
(3) It did not decide whether enemy combatants could be confined 
indefinitely on the basis of a diffuse "war on terrorism" not tethered 
to active combat operations abroad. 
20. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Four Justices (Souter ,  Ginsburg, Scalia and Stevens) would 
have gr anted the government far less leeway, but one (Thomas) would have granted the 
government  more. The line-up thus provides majority support (eight votes) for requirements 
at least as significan t as those Justice O'Connor supported but not for anything beyond 
those. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
21. Id. at 2639 (plurality opinion). 
22. Id. at 2650. 
23. More precisely, the Court held that the detain ee has (at some unspecified poin t) the 
right to n otice of the factual basis for his classification as an enemy combatant, and a "fair 
opportunity" to rebut the government's factual claims before a "neutral decisionmaker"; it 
rejected as inadequate the governmen t's position that its burden of supporting the enemy­
combatant designation could be met merely by producing " some evidence." Id. at 2648, 
2651 .  
24. Hamdi, 124 S.  Ct. at  2652 (plurality opin ion) .  
25. By implication , however, the Court has probably ruled out (at least under existing 
statutes) the prospect of indefinite confinement incommunicado, as it said that " [c]ertainly, 
we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized." Id. at 
2641. 
26. W hile noting the conventional understanding permitting  detention of prisoners of 
war until the conclusion of hostilities, the Court interestingly observed that "[i)f the practical 
circumstances of a given conflict [with respect to its duration ]  are entirely unlike those of the 
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel." 
Id. at 2641. 
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(4) Regarding those who dispute their status as enemy combatants, 
the Court did not decide what rights, if any, they must be afforded 
during the period before they are removed from the zone of combat.27 
(5) It did not decide how soon after removal from the combat zone 
the right to a hearing arises. 
(6) It did not decide what acts, other than participation in armed 
conflict against U.S. or allied military forces would be sufficient to 
justify classification as an enemy combatant.28 
(7) Beyond the three core safeguards that must always be 
respected in cases of factual dispute (notice, a fair opportunity to 
rebut factual allegations, and a neutral decisionmaker) , the Court did 
not decide the kind of tribunal, the procedural safeguards, and the 
burden of proof that due process requires. The plurality, beneath its 
nominally noncommittal language,29 did send a strong signal that it 
would allow hearsay evidence, a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
the government, and a military tribunal like ones that Army 
Regulations already contemplate.30 Yet it remains uncertain whether 
and under what circumstances the Court as a whole will accept 
measures of that sort. Four justices rejected such measures explicitly,31 
and the plurality did not focus on their implications in any detail. 
(8) The Court did not decide what procedures must be followed in 
the case of persons seized outside a zone of active combat - and in 
particular to U.S. citizens seized within the United States. Although 
such persons undoubtedly are now entitled, at a minimum, to the due 
process rights available in a case of battlefield seizure (Hamdi), the 
question whether such persons are entitled to more, either as a matter 
of statute32 or constitutional due process, was expressly left open.33 
27. Id. at 2649 ("[I]nitial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we 
have discussed here. " ). 
28. The Court addressed only the "narrow category" of " individuals who fought against 
the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban," Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640, and 
expressly excluded consideration of other situations that the government might classify as 
sufficient to support an enemy-combatant designation. Id. at 2639. 
29. "[T] he exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside fr om these core 
elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon 
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for 
example, may need to be accepted . . . .  " Id. at 2649 (emphasis added). 
30. Id. at 2651 (referring, as illustrative of an acceptably neutral forum, to the tribunals 
authorized by Army Regulation 190-8 § 1-6 (1997)). Similarly, with respect to the 
admissibility of hearsay (and thus the concomitant restriction on the detainee's ability to 
cross-examine witnesses against him) "a  habeas court in a case such as this may accept 
affidavit evidence . . . .  " See id. at 2652. 
31 .  Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2660-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000). 
33. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2639 (plurality opinion). 
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On all these matters, the Court evidently remains troubled by 
arguments suggesting an imperative need for deference to the 
government, that an overly intrusive judicial process may impede 
time-sensitive operations, interfere with the interrogation of suspects, 
compromise sources and methods of intelligence, and disclose 
important secrets. Arguments of this nature are not incoherent. The 
problems they suggest, however unlikely in specific contexts, are 
perfectly plausible in others. The principal objection to such claims is 
not that they are factually implausible but that the benefits of judicial 
deference come at a potentially staggering cost - placing individual 
liberty in the hands of a single person, the Commander in Chief, and 
dangerously weakening the checks on this form of executive power. If 
we wish to ask, as a matter of first principles, whether the rule of law 
really pays its way in this context, the answer cannot come from logic 
or rigorous empirical proof; we can rely only on practical judgment, 
guided by the uncertain lessons of past and present experience. 
II. THE HIST ORY 
Contrary to the contemporary conventional wisdom,34 judges in 
previous wars did not place the president's powers as Commander in 
Chief wholly beyond judicial scrutiny. The history has been explored 
in detail elsewhere,35 but the highlights should be mentioned. The 
history includes many instances of unwarranted judicial deference and 
a frequent pattern of invalidating emergency powers only after the 
crisis had passed.36 Some of these episodes we have subsequently 
acknowledged to be shameful mistakes. Congress did so formally and 
explicitly in the case of the World War II Japanese internments.37 But 
on other occasions, courts reviewed presidential claims of military 
necessity and held them insufficient to override constitutional rights. 
In particular, Ex parte Milligan,38 Ex parte Endo39 and Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku40 all insisted that military power to detain civilians (or 
34. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Civil Liberties After 9111, COMMENTARY, July-Aug. 2003, 
at 29-35; Ruth W edgwood, The Rule of Law and the War on Terror, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 23, 
2003, at A27. 
35. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Fred Korematsu, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 
(2003) (Mem.) (No. 03-334); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN 7- 10 (2002). 
36. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME (1998). 
37. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Fred Korematsu, supra note 35, at 18-21. 
38. 71 U.S. (4 W all.) 2 (1866). 
39. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
40. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
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those who claimed to be civilians) within the United States must 
remain subordinate to the Article III courts and the safeguards of the 
Bill of Rights. Stressing a powerful presumption against extrajudicial 
deprivation of liberty, the Court in Endo held that legislation and 
Executive Orders governing the removal of Japanese-Americans from 
the West Coast - though upheld in Korematsu v. United States41 -
authorized removal only and could not be interpreted to authorize 
detention.42 Invoking the same presumption, the Court in Duncan held 
that Congress's approval of "martial law" in Hawaii during World 
War II could not be read to authorize the trial of civilians in military 
courts.43 
Indeed, contemporary rhetoric has drastically distorted the original 
conception of the Commander in Chief's role. President Bush is 
sometimes introduced to civilian audiences as "our Commander in 
Chief," and in cases like Padilla the Administration has sought to 
invoke Commander-in-Chief powers to support presidential authority 
to detain erstwhile civilians accused of involvement with the enemy. 
Yet as Justice Jackson put it, "the Constitution did not contemplate 
that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will 
constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries 
and its inhabitants."44 Article II's Commander-in-Chief clause was 
unmistakably designed to place the military under civilian control, not 
to place civilians under military control. 
In short, judicial decisions consistently reflected two judgments: 
that even under wartime conditions, protection against the risk of 
unjust incarceration required the robust procedural safeguards of the 
Bill of Rights; and that threats to national security, even when 
convincing, could be less important than the dangers of overreaching 
by a well-intentioned but overzealous executive branch. Thus, the 
unreviewable executive power claimed after September 11 cannot be 
viewed as the Administration's defenders have often portrayed it, as a 
routine practice sanctioned by long-standing tradition. The Hamdi 
plurality accurately described the history in reminding us that "a state 
of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the 
rights of the Nation's citizens," and that even in wartime "unless 
Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus [assures] 
an important judicial check on the Executive's discretion in the realm 
of detentions."45 
41. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
42. Endo, 323 U.S. at 300-01. 
43. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 322-23. 
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring opinion). 
45. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2650, 2648, 2650 (plurali ty opini on). 
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Yet even as they were rejected, the Administration's forceful 
claims for unchecked power decisively shifted the terms of the debate. 
The Hamdi plurality apparently felt it could vindicate traditional due­
process norms merely by requiring "some system" for challenging 
executive judgments;46 its instinct for seeking a middle ground left the 
plurality predisposed to compromise. It assumed that ordinary 
safeguards ought to be diluted simply because interests out of the 
ordinary were implicated. If that approach ultimately commands a 
majority of the Court, the outcome will fall far short of one insisting, 
as did such decisions as Milligan and Kahanamoku, on complete Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment guarantees in fully independent Article III 
courts. Whatever the ground on which one might defend such an 
approach, it represents a significant departure from the predominant 
pattern of wartime American courts. 
III. CONTE MPORARY COUNTE R-TE RRORI SM ME ASU RE S AB ROAD 
This Section confronts the principal reason why checks and 
balances preserved in previous wars might be considered too 
dangerous to preserve now - the concern that modern terrorists pose 
significantly different challenges. Since the 1970s many nations have 
faced persistent problems of terrorism.47 Some instances, in Germany, 
Italy and France, were troublesome but never seriously threatened the 
established regime. In contrast, Basque separatist terrorism in Spain 
and Kurdish separatist terrorism in Turkey were (and remain) 
entrenched, serious threats to the public order and territorial integrity 
of those nations. This section examines the two cases that are probably 
the most severe and the most relevant to American traditions of due 
process - the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the problem of violence 
in Northern Ireland. 
The foreign experience shows a trend that might surprise many 
Americans. In the mid-1960s due-process requirements proliferated in 
America, far beyond anything familiar in other countries. Critics of 
this development often looked to Europe for confirmation that 
Western nations could respect liberty and democratic values without 
saddling themselves with the Warren Court's elaborate scheme of 
46. Id. at 2651 .  
47. Definitions of  terrorism are notoriously difficult and politic ally c harged. For present 
purposes it is suffic ient to acc ept the decidedly non-neutral perspec tive of the threatened 
nation itself. W e  are c oncerned with identifying the extent to which offic ials c ommitted to 
the politic al status quo c onsider independent c hecks and balances tolerable - and important 
to pr eserve - even when fac ing severe c hallenges to their authority. For our purposes, 
therefore, terrorism is any organized effort to kill public offic ials or c ivilians for purposes of 
making a politic al statement, striking fear in the population, or undermining the authority of 
the established government. 
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safeguards.48 The next three decades saw two seemingly contradictory 
developments in Europe. First, public order deteriorated dramatically, 
not only because of rising crime, but also because many European 
countries experienced persistent terrorism. Second, over the same 
period when public safety and even the stability of several European 
states was increasingly threatened, European community institutions 
began to elaborate restrictive rules to control police power. By the 
1990s, the nations of Western Europe found themselves subject, just as 
we are, to a detailed, constitutionally mandated "code of criminal 
procedure." Even in the context of emergency counter-terrorism 
measures, the European nations now accept the enforcement of this 
code by independent, unelected judges, nearly all of whom are not 
even nationals of the countries against which they render their 
decisions. 
The Israeli pattern is similar. Courts developed constitutional 
norms much like those of their European counterparts. Over the 
period since 1999, in which the Palestinian intifada has grown in 
intensity, one might expect that Israeli courts would have become 
increasingly deferential to military and administrative authorities. In 
fact, the opposite has occurred; in terrorism cases, Israeli courts have 
become increasingly interventionist. 
The resulting European and Israeli norms cannot by themselves 
establish the meaning of due process in our own constitution. But they 
seem entitled to considerable weight where, as here, they in no way 
argue for departure from our own settled standards,49 but instead 
suggest that the traditional American commitment to judicial review, 
largely respected in our previous wars, remains equally applicable to 
our current circumstances. 
A. Israel 
1 .  The Context 
Israel's security problems are well known. From the moment of its 
founding in 1948, it has been in a formal state of war and often in 
active military operations against nations on its borders. In addition, it 
has confronted uprisings against its occupation forces in the West 
Bank and Gaza (including the intifadas of 1987 and 2000 to present) 
and has been the frequent target of lethal suicide bombings and other 
terror attacks against civilian targets in the population centers of Israel 
48. See, e.g. , Miranda v. Arizon a, 384 U.S. 436, 522 (1966) (Harlan ,  J., dissenting) 
(referrin g to the English " Judges' Rules"). 
49. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), where the Court drew on 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights to guide the in terpretation of our due­
process clause and to support its conclusi on that one of its own prior decisions was wrong. 
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itself. Such attacks have caused enormous numbers of casualties and 
widespread disruption and fear in ordinary civilian life. Most Israelis 
believe that terrorist organizations responsible for these attacks "have 
set Israel's annihilation as their goal,"50 and that national survival 
requires the strongest possible antiterrorism responses. Nonetheless, 
Israeli law embodies a strong system of judicial checks in national­
security cases. And paradoxically, as suicide attacks in Israel and 
terrorism worldwide have intensified, those checks have become 
increasingly robust. 
2. The Legal Framework 
Given the grave threats to Israeli security, it is not surprising that 
Israeli law-enforcement powers have been supplemented with special 
tools, and for terrorism investigations, many ordinary safeguards have 
been suspended from the beginning. Under Israel's Basic Law, all laws 
restricting personal freedom must "compl[y] with the ethical values of 
the State of Israel . . .  [and] not exceed necessity. "51 When regulations 
- including military regulations - infringe upon basic liberties in a 
manner that is "not proportionate," they are deemed 
unconstitutional.52 
50. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) 
P.D. 817. 
51. Basic Law: Human Digni ty an d Freedom, 1992, S.H. 1391, art. 8, in ISRAEL'S 
WRITIEN CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 1999). Al though Israel has yet to adopt a formal 
con stitution , on many matters of " constitutional significance" its legislature has en acted 
" Basic Laws" - "enactments, which stand above other Laws and which generally can be 
adopted, amended or repealed only by a special majority." Aryeh Greenfield, 
" In troduction ," in id., at 4. 
The "Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom" was adopted only in 1992, but long 
before then , the Israel Supreme Court had developed a substantial body of  quasi­
constitutional law, " fashion [ing] the law of human rights out of whole cloth," and " creat[in g] 
a de facto system of judicial review in Israel that is quite similar to that employed by courts 
possessing the power to review primary legislation ." Stephen Goldstein , The Protection of 
Human Rights by Judges: The Israeli Experience, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY (M. Gibney & S. Frankowski, eds. 1999) at 55, 60. As early as 
1949, the Israel Supreme Court held that " every person i s  endowed with a natural right [of 
liberty] ," id., at 59, and accordingly that executive regulations (the primary source of law in 
Israel) cannot restrict individual freedoms, in the absence of specifi c  authorizing legislation . 
W here such legislation existed, the court held that ambiguous terms should be construed as 
not restricting in dividual liberty, id., and that if the legislature in tended to restrict liberty " it 
had to do so very explicitly, " id., at 61, even in the absence of an applicable Basic Law. 
W here Basic Laws do apply, moreover, the Israel Supreme Court has " held that these Basic 
Laws have normative supremacy over ordin ary laws and that the Court, therefore, may 
invalidate ordin ary laws that are in conflict with them." Id., at 56. 
52. H.C. 3239/02, Marab v. IDF Commander in the W est Bank, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 26 
(Isr.). For cases arising in the occupied territories, ordinary Israeli laws (including Basic 
Laws) are techn ically not applicable. But military regulations that infringe on basic liberties 
can nonetheless be ruled unconstitutional. For the occupied territories, the court applies the 
same principles that it applied within Israel during the period prior to adoption of the " Basic 
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In ordinary criminal proceedings, a suspect must be brought to 
court and a judge must approve the basis for detention within twenty­
four hours of arrest.53 But these requirements are qualified by a formal 
state of emergency that has been in force continuously since 1948. 
Indeed, even before independence, the British Mandate adopted 
special antiterrorism authority the Defense (Emergency) 
Regulations (DER) of 1945. The DER granted the British High 
Commissioner broad, largely unreviewable discretion to demolish the 
homes of those considered responsible for terrorist attacks and to 
detain anyone whose detention was judged "necessary or expedient 
for maintaining public order or securing public safety or state 
security. "54 
From 1945 to 1948, the British used these powers mainly against 
the terror tactics of the Jewish underground. But the DER, along with 
other laws of the British Mandate period, remained in effect after 
statehood, and for decades it provided the framework for Israeli 
security measures. When Israeli forces occupied the West Bank and 
Gaza after 1967, the DER framework was applied there as well.55 
Nonetheless, with its grant of virtually unlimited executive and 
military powers, the DER was considered incompatible with the rule 
of law, and in 1979 Israel replaced it with a more limited regime, the 
Emergency Powers (Detention) Law (EPDL). 
The EPDL addresses the principal accountability concerns that 
arise in connection with detention: the duration of detention, access to 
counsel, access to the courts, and their role. The U.S. government, as 
we have seen, claims the legitimacy of, and the need for, unchecked 
executive power in all these respects; the Hamdi plurality, unwilling to 
go that far, nonetheless was disposed to accept extended detention 
and a vastly reduced role for judicial review. The EPDL is 
considerably less sweeping. It allows the Minister of Defense to issue 
an order of detention whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe 
that reasons of state Security or public security require that a 
particular person be detained. "56 A detainee can then be held for a 
Law: Human Dignity and Freedom" in 1992, and these principles are in all practical respects 
iden tical to those that the Basic Law requires. See note 51 ,  supra. 
53. See id.; Eliahu Hamon & Alex Stein , Israel, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY 217, 221-22, 226 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). 
54. Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative 
Detention in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining 
Chips?, 18 ARIZ . J. INT'L & COMP. L. 721 ,  755 (2001) (hereinafter Gross/]. 
55. The Israeli military extended the DER provision s to the occupied territories in 1967, 
but the Israel Supreme Court subsequently ruled that in any even t, those provisions (along 
with other law of the Mandate period) had remained in effect on the West Bank  throughout 
the 1948-1967 period of Jordan ian rule. Gross I, supra n ote 54, at 756 & n.145. 
56. Gross I, supra n ote 54, at 725. 
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maximum of forty-eight hours (double the period allowed in 
conventional criminal cases) ,  by which time the detention order must 
be submitted to a judge.57 If the court finds no reasonable basis for 
detention, or if the judge concludes that there are alternative means to 
meet the state's security needs, the detainee must be released. If the 
detention order is upheld, a judge must review and approve it again 
every three months. Detainees have the rights to access counsel after 
forty-eight hours (or in terrorism cases, after a maximum of twenty­
one days and subject to judicial review58), to know the reason for 
detention (unless a judge finds that the information would jeopardize 
security), and to be present in court for all legal proceedings (unless a 
judge finds that State security requires otherwise).59 
Occupation authorities operating in the West Bank and Gaza have 
more flexibility. But even in that context, military authorities and the 
occupation administration remain subject to judicial oversight. For 
both suspected terrorists and ordinary criminal defendants, Order 378, 
adopted in 1970, allowed detention prior to judicial review in occupied 
territories for up to eighteen days, on the basis of an officer's 
"reasonable reason [sic] to believe that a crime has been committed."60 
But following the 1988 report of an official commission, the detention 
period prior to the judicial hearing was shortened to eight days for all 
categories of suspects detained in the occupied territories.61 With 
respect to the right to counsel, terrorism suspects and ordinary 
defendants face different regimes. Under Order 378, access to counsel 
for ordinary criminal defendants is normally not impeded.62 In 
contrast, for defendants suspected of violating security laws, Order 378 
57. A similar forty-eight-hour limit applies in the case of Israeli soldiers facing the 
possibility of charges under military law. Israel' s  Military Justice Law-1955 allowed for 
detention for up to ninety-six hours before the suspect had to be brought before a military 
judge. But the Israeli Supreme Court held this period excessive and therefore 
unconstitutional; subsequently the MJL was amended to provide that a soldier detained 
under the MJL must be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours. Gross I, supra n ote 
54, at 726; see also Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 20. 
58. See Hamon & Stein , supra n ote 53, at 234. 
59. Gross I, supra n ote 54, at 756. 
60. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 29 (citing  Order Concerning Secur ity Provisions, No. 
378, 5730 - 1970 (Apr. 20, 1970) [herein after Order 378)). 
61. See Symposium, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of 
Investigation of the General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 ISRAEL 
L. REV. (Spring-Summer 1989). Under Order 378, a more restrictive regime applied to 
"admin istrative" detention not tied to a conventional criminal investigation . In such cases 
detention prior to judicial review was limited to ninety-six hours. See Marab, 57 (2) P.O . 349 
para. 29, f or a discussion of Order 378, section 87B(a). But a subsequent provision Military 
Order 1226, adopted in 1988, extended admin istrative detention to eight days as well. See id. 
paras. 5, 29. 
62. The law makes provision for delaying access to counsel under certain circumstances 
f or a few hours and in exceptional cases, for up to nin ety-six hours. See id. para. 37. 
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originally permitted denial of access to counsel for as long as thirty 
days in the occupied territories.63 
In 2002, intensive terrorist attacks and large-scale military 
operations on the West Bank prompted changes in this regime. In 
March 2002 the Israel Defense Forces ("IDF") launched Operation 
Defensive Wall ("ODW"), in which Israeli troops and heavy armor 
moved into areas of the West Bank previously under the 
administration of the Palestinian Authority. The operation sought to 
move Israeli troops into West Bank cities where militant terrorist cells 
were based, to arrest wanted persons hiding there, and more generally 
to sweep up suspected members of terrorist organizations. By May 
2002, the IDF had detained about 7000 persons in connection with 
Operation Defensive Wall. After initial screening, many of these 
detainees were quickly released, while others were moved to 
detention facilities and held for further investigation. By May 15, 2002, 
more than 5000 of the detainees had been released, and 1600 
remained in detention. 
The initial detention and screenings were carried out within the 
framework of Order 378, but it soon became apparent that the IDF 
was far from complying with its requirements, in particular the 
requirement that detainees be brought to court within eight days. To 
regularize the situation, the Israeli military promulgated a new 
detention regime on April 5, 2002. The new regulation, Order 1500, 
allowed detention for up to eighteen days of anyone seized in West 
Bank military operations, based solely on an IDF officer's 
determination that "the circumstances of [the person's] detention raise 
the suspicion that he endangers or may be a danger to the security of 
the area, the IDF, or the public."64 Order 1500 allowed the detainee to 
protest to military authorities within eight days, but made no provision 
for court appearance or judicial review until the end of the eighteen­
day period.65 In addition, Order 1500 barred all ODW detainees from 
meeting with a lawyer at any point during the eighteen-day period and 
allowed for denying access to counsel on a case-by-case basis for an 
additional fifteen-day period. Isolation from counsel was thus possible 
for a total of thirty-three days (compared to the maximum thirty-day 
period allowed under the prior Order 378 regime). 
Order 1500 was to remain in effect only for two months, but as 
IDF operations continued on the West Bank, the special detention 
63. Order 378 allowed the head of the inves tigation to bar access to a lawyer for a 
period of u p  to fifteen days, and a reviewing administrator was granted the authority to 
extend that bar for an additional fifteen days if convi nced that the measure is "necessary for 
the security of the area or for the benefit of the investigation." See id. 
64. Marab, 57 (2) P.O. 349 para. 3. 
65. At that point, if the military sought further detention, it was required to s eek judicial 
approval under the Order 378 procedure. 
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regime was extended twice and remained in effect until January 2003. 
After the initial two-month period, however, the length of detention 
prior to judicial review was shortened to twelve days66, and the period 
of automatic isolation from counsel was shortened first to four days 
and later to two. Including the authority to deny access to counsel on a 
case-by-case basis under Order 378, the maximum period of isolation 
from counsel varied from thirty-two to thirty-four days.67 Detainees 
were not held completely incommunicado, however. As soon as they 
were removed from the zone of combat to a detention facility, which 
occurred within forty-eight hours, they had the right to be visited by 
representatives of the International Red Cross, and their families were 
informed of their whereabouts.68 
3. The Judicial Role 
Prior to adoption of the EPDL, there was little opportunity for 
judicial review, and for many years following its adoption, Israeli 
courts proceeded cautiously; they almost invariably deferred to the 
judgment of the military authorities.69 Judicial attitudes began to 
change in the early 1990s, as the Israeli Supreme Court progressively 
dismantled various doctrinal barriers to judicial review, such as 
standing and justiciability,70 and showed itself increasingly willing to 
question claims of military necessity. The court's current attitude, 
summarized by its chief justice, is simply that "everything is 
justiciable. "71 
The judicial role in detention hearings has evolved accordingly. 
Initially, factual review was highly deferential; it was said that the 
court should determine only whether the military judgment was 
reasonable.72 More recently, virtually all deference has disappeared 
from the standard of judicial review, at least in theory. In the Israeli 
66. See Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 6, for a discussion of Order 1505. 
67. Id. para. 6, 39-40. 
68. Id. para. 46. 
69. Gross I, supra note 54, at 758, 759. 
70. Stephen Golds tein, The Protection of Human Rights by Judges: The Israeli 
Experience, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? 55 (Mark 
Gibney & Stanis law Frankowski eds ., 1999); Gross I, supra note 54, at 758, 759; see Marab, 
57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 46 ("[U]nder our approach to the issue of s tanding, any person or 
organization interes ted in the fate of a detainee may [appeal to the High Court of Jus tice in 
a petition agains t their detention]."). 
71. Gross I, supra note 54, at 758 (quoting H.C. 1635/90, Zharzhevski v. Prime Minis ter, 
48(1) P.D. 749, 855-57). 
72. Id. at 759 & n.166 (s tating that "a court mus t examine the reasonableness of the 
decis ion to issue the order") .  
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conception, a detention hearing is not a review of an executive 
decision; rather, detention is seen as a judicial act: 
The judge does not ask himself whether a reasonable police officer 
would have been permitted to carry out the detention. The judge asks 
himself whether, in his opinion, there are sufficient investigative 
materials to support the continuation of the detention . 
. . . Judicial detention is the norm, while detention by one who is not a 
judge is the exception.73 
Of course, detainees seized on a battlefield fall squarely within the 
exception. In such situations, however, the detention must be brought 
within the normal judicial framework as soon as possible. Hence, even 
when a detention occurs in the course of a military operation, the 
judge's role (in theory) remains one of making a de novo decision, not 
one of reviewing for "reasonableness" the decision of a field 
commander. 74 
Detention need not be supported by prima facie evidence of guilt; 
the judge need only find "reasonable suspicion that the detainee 
committed a security crime and reasonable reason [sic) to presume 
that his release will disturb security or the investigation."75 The 
decisions frame this test as a demanding one. The evidence must show 
that the detainee would "almost certainly" pose a danger and must 
indicate a situation "so grave as to leave no choice."76 In its most 
recent pronouncements, the Israeli Supreme Court has used language 
suggesting an especially stringent approach: 
[J]udicial review should [not] be superficial. . . .  [A judge must] "ensure 
that every piece of evidence connected to the matter at hand be 
submitted to him. Judges should never allow quantity to affect either 
quality or the extent of the judicial examination . . . .  Depriving one of his 
liberty . . .  is a severe step which the law only allows for in circumstances 
which demand that such be done for overwhelming reasons of 
security . . . .  [The] security needs [must] have no other reasonable 
solution. "77 
73. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 32. 
74. " [Even when] the initial detention is done without a judicial order . . .  everything 
possible should be done to rapidly pass the investigation over to the regular uudicial) track, 
placing the detention in the hands of a judge and not an investigator." Id. 
75. Id. para. 33. 
76. Gross I, supra note 54, at 763 (emphasis omitted). The law is silent on the burden of 
proof that must be met to support detention, but the commentators assume that the State 
must establish the required elements by "clear and convincing evidence." Gross I, supra note 
54, at 773; Emanuel Gross, Human Rights in Administrative Proceedings: A Quest for 
Appropriate Evidentiary Standards, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215 (2001). 
77. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 33 (quoting H.C. 253/88, Sajadia v. Minister of Defense, 
42(3) P.D. 801 ,  820, 821 (Shamgar, P.)). 
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Nonetheless, it would be easy to exaggerate the intrusiveness of 
judicial review and its practical significance. Evidentiary standards are 
more flexible in detention hearings than in criminal cases; they may be 
comparable to those that the Hamdi plurality seemed prepared to 
accept for evidence adduced to support battlefield seizures.78 And 
where security concerns warrant, judges can withhold evidence from 
the defense and review it in camera. In such cases, the judge generally 
will consider only written testimony and therefore will be unable to 
assess credibility.79 Commentators have expressed concern that such 
situations may lead to miscarriages of justice and incarceration of the 
innocent.80 
Moreover, judicial detention rulings in terrorism cases are 
independent in theory but highly deferential in fact; Israeli courts 
rarely release suspects detained by the IDF or the security services. 
But judges do review the evidentiary basis for detention and do not 
function simply as rubber stamps.81 And in a number of high-visibility 
decisions, the Israeli Supreme Court, rejecting claims of military 
necessity, has struck down important security measures as violative of 
civil liberties. Three of these cases are worth mentioning to give a 
sense of the judicial role in high-stakes situations. The first two, the 
interrogation-methods case and the bargaining-chip case, have already 
received some attention in the United States and can be summarized 
briefly. The last case, recently decided, is worth extended discussion 
because it deals directly with a problem now in the forefront of 
American litigation, the detention of alleged unlawful combatants. 
4. Interrogation 
In a 1999 decision, the Israeli Supreme Court barred the Israeli 
security services from using certain harsh techniques of interrogation, 
such as sleep deprivation and "shaking."82 The court ruled that Israel's 
78. See supra Section I. When an Israeli court decides to deviate from the rules of 
evidence it must state its reasons for doing so; and hearsay can be given weight only if it has 
"evidentiary value." Gross I, supra note 54, at 762, 773 & n.181. 
79. Gross I, supra note 54, at 761. 
80. Gross I, supra note 54, at 762 & n.185. 
81. See Goldstein, supra note 51 at 62, noting the "increased willingness of the High 
Court of Justice to challenge the factual and legal correctness of governmental assertions of 
'security interests.' " Likewise Gross I, supra note 54, at 758-61, notes that Israeli courts no 
longer refrain from intervening in detention decisions and that judicial review, though 
"inherently weak," id., at 761, does examine the length of detention and the evidentiary basis 
for it; Israeli courts sometimes shorten the period of detention, and they have denied 
military commanders the authority to re-extend a detention once a court has shortened it, 
id., at 761 & n. 177. 
82. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, para. 24. 
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Basic Law prohibits torture, inhuman treatment, and "any degrading 
handling whatsoever."83 Moreover, the court stressed, the prohibition 
is absolute; no exceptions are permissible, even when - as the 
security services insisted - such techniques would help elicit 
information necessary to thwart a terrorist attack. Though 
acknowledging "the difficult reality in which Israel finds herself 
securitywise," the court concluded: 
This is the destiny of a democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it 
and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. 
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its 
back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and 
recognition of an individual's liberty constitutes an important component 
in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they [add to] its 
strength.84 
5. Bargaining Chips 
Between 1986 and 1987, a number of Lebanese citizens were 
captured and convicted of acts of terrorism against Israeli forces. After 
the Lebanese had served their sentences, many were held under 
EPDL detention orders. In 1994, when an Israeli aviator was shot 
down over Lebanon and captured by a local terrorist group, the Israeli 
government hoped to obtain his release in exchange for the Lebanese 
prisoners. But first it had to reconfirm its power to hold them, by 
extending detention orders that were about to expire. In its petition to 
renew the detentions, the government did not argue that these 
prisoners posed a direct threat to national security. Rather, it insisted 
that because the Lebanese could be exchanged for the captured 
aviator, their detention for purposes of the negotiation met the EPDL 
standard that "reasons of State security or public security require that 
a particular person be detained. "85 
The Israeli Supreme Court initially agreed with that view. But after 
sharp criticism from civil liberties advocates,86 the court granted 
rehearing and reversed itself. The chief justice (who had also authored 
the previous decision ruling the other way) reasoned that although the 
EPDL standard was "sufficiently broad to embrace events where the 
danger . . .  did not ensue from the particular person himself," that 
conclusion was merely "the first stage" in the process of statutory 
construction.87 The court held that because democratic principles 
83. Id. para. 23. 
84. Id. para. 39. 
85. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law § 2. 1979, S.H. 76. 
86. See Gross I, supra note 54, at 729. 
87. See id. at 726. 
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guide legal interpretation, the EPDL must be deemed to have dual 
goals, preservation of both State security and "the basic values of 
dignity and freedom vested in every person. "88 In striking that balance, 
the court ruled that a person could be detained only if that person 
himself posed a threat to the state. The aviator's family, along with a 
sizeable segment of public opinion, was infuriated, but this time the 
court rejected petitions for further rehearing and stood by its decision 
ordering the release of the Lebanese. 
6. Detaining Unlawful Combatants 
The most recent litigation testing Israeli checks and balances 
involved a challenge to the army's  new procedures for detaining 
alleged "unlawful combatants" during military sweeps that began in 
March 2002.89 The new regime (Order 1500) changed the "normal" 
West Bank regulations (Order 378) in three important respects. The 
period of detention without judicial review was extended from eight 
days to eighteen, access to counsel was barred for the entire eighteen­
day period, and the army's obligation to initiate its investigation was 
deferred for eight days. 
The Israeli military defended these measures with national­
security arguments similar to those advanced to support the enemy­
combatant detentions in the United States: the need to defer to 
military judgments made during combat, the difficulty of establishing 
crucial facts, the importance of time for a successful interrogation, and 
the need to protect confidential sources. The IDF insisted that the 
chaotic military situation in West Bank towns and refugee camps 
made it impossible investigate suspected PLO and Hamas fighters in 
the immediate wake of their capture. Terrorists had intermingled with 
civilians "without bearing any symbols that would identify them as 
members of combating forces and distinguish them from the civilian 
population, in utter violation of the laws of warfare."90 Moreover 
investigation was time consuming because of "lack of cooperation on 
the part of those being investigated and their attempts to hide their 
identities"91; in many instances the IDF was unable to ascertain even 
their names. Thus, the IDF argued, "it is pointless to bring detainees 
before a judge, when they have not yet been identified, and the 
investigative material against them has not yet undergone the 
88. Gross I, supra note 54, at 726. 
89. For discussion of the background of these new procedures, see supra text 
accompanying notes 64-68. 
90. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 31 (quoting IDF Response Brief para. 51 (May 15, 
2002)). 
91. Id. para. 31 (quoting IDF Response Brief para. 62 (June 11, 2002)). 
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necessary processing"; a shorter time frame would simply force the 
release of many dangerous detainees.92 
The Israeli military did not suggest (as has the U.S. Government) 
that these conditions justify indefinite confinement with no access to 
courts at all. The IDF argued only that such circumstances support 
delay for an additional ten days before bringing enemy combatants to 
court. The Hamdi plurality, confronting similar problems, suggested 
no time frame for removing detainees from the battlefield or allowing 
them to contest their classifications.93 It expressed no impatience and 
showed no evident discomfort with the two-year-plus periods that 
detentions had been all0wed to remain unreviewed. 
The Israeli Supreme Court, in contrast, found the military 
arguments insufficient to support even a ten-day delay in judicial 
intervention. The court struck down major parts of the regulations and 
imposed its normal standards of judicial oversight. The court's central 
premise was that "Ll]udicial intervention . . . is essential to the 
principle of the rule of law," and that "fundamental human rights 
require prompt review of detention by a judicial authority 
independent of the executive. "94 The court acknowledged that 
"[i]ntemational law does not specify the number of days during which 
a detainee may be held without judicial intervention," but concluded 
that the applicable principle is clear enough: "delays must not exceed 
a few days"; even "an 'unlawful combatant' . . . is to be brought 
promptly before a judge."95 
The court accepted practical constraints - up to a point. It 
acknowledged that " ' [r]egular' police detention is not the same as 
detention carried out 'during warfare in the area,' " and that it should 
not be "demanded that a judge accompany the fighting forces. "96 It 
agreed that in battlefield seizures, judicial intervention must be 
postponed, but only "until after detainees are taken out of the 
battlefield to a place where the initial investigation and judicial 
intervention can be carried out properly."97 Once the detainee is 
moved from the zone of combat, a process that can be completed 
within forty-eight hours even "during warfare," battlefield realities are 
no longer relevant, and a judicial hearing must occur promptly.98 
The court similarly rejected the military claim that the exigencies 
of warfare required an eight-day delay in initiating the investigation of 
92. Id. paras. 31-32. 
93. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
94. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349. 
95. Id. paras. 26, 27. 
96. Id. para. 30. 
97. Id. 
98. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 46. 
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detainees. Again, the court accepted several key practical points -
that "investigations should not be performed during warfare or during 
military operations"; that "investigation can only begin when the 
detainee . . .  is brought to a detention facility"; and that "at a location 
which holds large number of detainees, some time may pass before it 
is possible to organize for initial investigations." Nonetheless, the 
court held that the military must "begin the investigation rapidly at 
this initial stage."99 The court therefore struck down the eight-day 
(later four-day) grace period conferred by Order 1500 and its progeny, 
ruling in effect that the investigation must begin more or less 
immediately.100 
One facet of the military-necessity argument is worth particular 
attention. The IDF insisted that the scale of its operations and the 
number of detainees made it impossible to process them in the usual 
time periods. The court was not persuaded: 
Security needs, on the one hand, and the liberty of the individual on the 
other, all lead to the need to increase the number of investigators . . . .  
[A ]nd even more so when it was expected that the number of detainees 
would rise due to Operation Defensive Wall . . . .  
"A society is measured, among other things, by the relative weight it 
attributes to personal liberty. This weight must express itself not only in 
pleasant remarks and legal literature, but also in the budget . . . .  Society 
must be ready to pay a price to protect human rights."101 
Similarly, the court said, difficulty in arranging for more judges cannot 
justify delaying judicial review: 
The current emergency conditions undoubtedly demanded large-scale 
deployment of forces . . . .  However, by the same standards, effort and 
resources must be invested into the protection of the detainees' 
rights . . . .  Such is the case . . .  with regard to prosecutors as well.102 
The court declined to set a specific deadline for the judicial 
hearing; instead it suspended the effect of its ruling for six months to 
give the military an opportunity to implement a more expeditious 
system.103 In subsequent regulations, the IDF provided for a judicial 
99. Id. para. 48. 
100. Id. paras. 48-49. In its effort to defend the delays in initiating an investigation and 
holding the judicial hearing, the IDF sought to present classified information, but the court 
ruled that it was "neither appropriate nor desirable" for it to consider such information. Id. 
paras. 36, 49. 
101. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 48 (quoting H.C. 6055/95, Tzemach v. Minister of 
Defense, 53(5) P.D. 241, 281 (Zamir, J.)). 
102. Id. para. 35 (quoting H.C. 253/88, Sajadia v. Minister of Defense, 42(3) P.D. 801, 
819-20 (Shamgar, P.)). 
103. Id. paras. 35-36. 
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hearing within eight days, in effect the same period applicable under 
normal Order 378 procedures. There has been no effort to overturn 
the court's decision in the Knesset, and apparently the eight-day time 
limit is now being respected in practice. 104 
With respect to access to counsel, the court allowed more leeway. 
It found that the right to counsel is not absolute, and that "significant 
security considerations" can justify delay, as when "the lives of the 
combat forces will be endangered due to opportunities to pass 
messages out of the facility." But, said the court, "advancing the 
investigation [i.e. facilitating interrogation] is not a sufficient reason to 
prevent the meeting . . . .  [T]here must be an element of necessity."  It 
allowed the army to deny contact with counsel for up to 34 days, four 
days longer than the maximum permitted under ordinary occupation 
regulations.105 
Under the resulting system for the occupied territory, denial of 
access to counsel is automatic only for the first two or four days; 
thereafter access can be denied for two fifteen-day periods, but only 
after a case-by-case determination of necessity. When necessity is 
found, however, the detainee will be forced to face his judicial hearing 
(after the eighth day) without the assistance of counsel. And in such a 
case, the same security concerns would probably prompt the court to 
refuse the detainee access to the evidence against him. In effect, the 
judicial decision on detention would occur entirely ex parte, hardly an 
ideal arrangement from a civil-liberties perspective. Even so, the 
regime provides some check on military judgments and some 
accountability. And the need to dispense with the stronger safeguard 
of adversary challenge is itself determined by the court, not by the 
officials whose own actions would be under scrutiny.106 
104. E-mail from Lila Margalit, counsel to petitioners in Marab, 57(2) P.D. 349, to Eyal 
Benvenisti, Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University (Nov. 5, 2003) (on file with author). 
105. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 37, 45 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
106. The resulting regime of judicial review is, of course, rather weak in such 
exceptional cases - i.e., in eighth-day detention hearings for alleged enemy combatants 
seized in occupied territory and denied immediate access to counsel. Yet we should note that 
in the United States, at a roughly comparable stage of the ordinary criminal process - the 
forty-eight hour hearing to establish the legality of arrest - proceedings are also ex parte, 
continued detention requires only the minimal evidence necessary to establish probable 
cause, and as a result American judicial review is similarly weak even in routine, non­
terrorism cases. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Significantly, however, the eighth­
day hearing in Israel can result in detention for three months (renewable at that point, but 
only at a hearing at which the detainee would by then have access to counsel). In contrast, in 
the United States the ex parte probable-cause hearing can result in detention only until the 
accused can make bail. 
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7. Conclusion 
Regardless of what one might think of Israeli policies vis-a-vis the 
Palestinians, there is no doubt that from the perspective of the Israelis 
themselves, the country faces a grave security situation, with ever­
present danger to its military forces and civilian population centers, a 
potentially never-ending threat that challenges its capacity to survive 
as an independent nation. Nevertheless, Israeli courts have put in 
place a strong, increasingly robust system of judicial checks. 
Accountability in national security cases extends not only to law­
enforcement actions within Israel proper but also to detentions that 
result from military operations targeting "unlawful combatants" in 
territories not juridically part of Israel itself. Military and executive 
officials seem to accept the court decisions imposing these safeguards. 
And through more than twenty years of experience, during which the 
terrorist threat and the judicial checking power have both intensified, 
there has been no major effort to flout these safeguards openly or to 
overturn them by legislation. 
B .  Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
After the shock of September 11 ,  2001, it is easy to forget the fear 
and loss of life occasioned by the intractable troubles in Northern 
Ireland. It is important to recall the proportions of the crisis. 
1 .  The Context107 
Britain granted independence to the Irish Free State (now the 
Republic of Ireland) in 1922, but partitioned the island and retained 
sovereignty over the six northeastern counties (Ulster) where 
Protestant "Loyalists," roughly two-thirds of the population, preferred 
to retain ties to the Crown. Britain also granted Northern Ireland a 
large degree of home rule under a local Parliament in which 
Protestants held unshakeable control, reinforced by gerrymandering 
and other electoral maneuvers.108 In the 1960s a nonviolent civil rights 
movement began growing in the north, with the aim of combating 
housing, employment, and electoral discrimination against Catholics. 
Tensions escalated as militants associated with the Irish Republican 
Army ("IRA") gained influence within the civil rights movement and 
107. For more detailed accounts, from which the discussion in text is drawn, see MARIE­
THERESE FAY ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND'S TROUBLES: THE HUMAN COSTS (1999); 
CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (2d ed. 1992); 
DERMOT P.J. WALSH, BLOODY SUNDAY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
(2000). 
108. WALSH, supra note 107, at 18-22. 
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as Protestant Loyalists formed their own militant organizations and 
"declar[ed] war" on the IRA in 1966.109 By 1969, civil rights 
demonstrations had turned into violent confrontations between 
Catholic protesters on one side and local police (the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, or "RUC"), joined by angry Protestants, on the other. 
Protestants who opposed concessions to the Catholic civil rights 
movement forced the resignation of the reformist Northern Ireland 
prime minister and sponsored increasingly confrontational 
demonstrations of their own.1 1° 
The conflict soon outstripped the RUC's ability to maintain order, 
and in August 1969 the British Army was called in to restore peace. 
Nonetheless, the violence grew, and Protestant terror groups launched 
their own campaign, bombing and burning Catholic-owned property. 
In 1970 the violence on both sides escalated dramatically. By 1971 the 
situation had degenerated into a public-order crisis. In the first seven 
months of 1971 there were 304 bomb explosions; sixteen civilians and 
fifteen Army and RUC personnel were killed.1 1 1  A major riot followed 
on August 5, 1971 .  
Two days later, the Northern Ireland government assumed 
emergency powers, and at dawn on August 9 it launched "Operation 
Demetrius," an effort to round up suspected IRA terrorists. Security 
forces arrested 354 on the first day. Of those, 104 were released within 
forty-eight hours, and fourteen prime suspects were taken to secret 
interrogation centers, where questioning continued for days, aided by 
methods involving severe psychological and physical stress {the so­
called "five techniques" - hooding, sleep deprivation, continuous 
loud noise, deprivation of food and water, and forcing detainees to 
remain standing in awkward positions). Meanwhile, on August 13, the 
IRA called a press conference in Belfast to mock the operation and 
announce that only thirty IRA militants had been caught in the sweep. 
Violence continued, as did repressive actions in response. In 
December 1971, Loyalists bombed a Belfast bar, killing fifteen 
Catholics. In January 1972, British soldiers assigned to maintain order 
shot and killed thirteen Catholic demonstrators in Londonderry. IRA 
reprisals and other attacks, as many as five to ten each day, took a 
huge toll. In the seven months following Operation Demetrius, there 
were 1130 explosions, 2000 shootings, and a total of 233 fatalities ,  158 
of them civilian. At that point, in March 1972, the United Kingdom 
109. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310171, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 33 (1978) 
(Court judgment). 
1 10. Id. at 34-35. 
111 .  Id. at 34-36. 
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Parliament displaced the local Northern Ireland government and 
assumed direct rule.112 
The violence did not abate. On "Bloody Friday" in July 1972, the 
IRA detonated twenty bombs in the center of Belfast, killing eleven 
and seriously wounding 100 others. Terrorism by IRA and Loyalist 
factions occurred regularly throughout the 1970s. The IRA attacked in 
Britain as well. An October 1974 bombing in Guildford, England, 
killed five and injured 54.113 A month later, the IRA bombed two pubs 
in Birmingham, claiming twenty-one lives and injuring 184 in an attack 
that The Times of London described as an act of war.114 During the 
1970s, several prominent British politicians were assassinated, and in 
March 1979 a member of the House of Commons was killed by a car 
bomb on the grounds of Parliament. In 1982 an IRA attack against an 
army unit on parade in London killed eleven and injured thirty. On 
Christmas 1983 a car bomb exploded at Harrod's in London, killing six 
and injuring 93.115 
For the twenty-year period from the start of the troubles through 
1990, the casualty figures for Northern Ireland alone total more than 
2750 killed (2000 of them civilians) and more than 31,900 seriously 
injured, all in a territory with a population of only 1.5 million.116 For a 
city the size of New York, such figures would represent the equivalent 
of 1 1 ,000 civilian fatalities, the killing of 4300 law enforcement 
officers, and over 170,000 serious injuries attributable to terrorism. 
The public demand for firm counter-measures is easy to imagine. 
2. The UK Legal Framework 
The law governing arrest and detention in Northern Ireland is 
multi-layered and has been in constant flux. In addition to the 
ordinary rules of criminal procedure, a regime of emergency powers 
enacted in 1922 was still in place when the troubles began. That 
regime was replaced by new emergency legislation for Northern 
1 12. Id. at 38-41; FAY, supra note 107, at 27-28. 
1 13. FAY, supra note 107, at 30. 
1 14. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 22. 
1 15.  WALKER, supra note 107, at 245. 
116. See Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'l[15  
(1991). During the mid-1980s, a series of  temporary truces had reduced the fatality rate, but 
terrorism persisted on a wide scale until the early 1990s. In the context of peace negotiations, 
the IRA announced an end to its military operations in August 1994, British army patrols 
were reduced or suspended, and in April 1998 the Good Friday Accords began an era of 
relative peace. Even then, terrorist actions by splinter groups continued. In July 1998, a 
Loyalist bomb killed three children in their home, and a month later, a dissident faction of 
the IRA detonated a car bomb in a small market town, killing 29 and injuring over 200. FAY, 
supra note 107, at 43-49. 
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Ireland enacted on a "temporary" basis in 1972 and renewed at 
frequent intervals thereafter. Additional emergency powers were 
available in legislation applicable throughout the UK. Courts 
interpreted these enactments against the background of common law 
principles, World War II precedents and, most recently, the European 
Convention on Human Rights. From a beginning marked by virtually 
unrestricted military/executive powers, brutally implemented, the 
legislation and practice evolved to reflect a growing view that such 
harsh measures were unjust and counterproductive. 
a. Ordinary criminal investigation. The scope of executive power to 
detain, a sore point in British history for centuries, gave us Magna 
Carta's most famous passage: "No Freeman shall be taken or 
imprisoned . . .  but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of 
the land."117 And continued struggle over royal efforts to evade this 
restriction fueled development of the writ of habeas corpus, to . 
guarantee availability of a judicial check upon all forms of executive 
detention. 1 18 
By the late twentieth century, these principles had evolved into 
rules governing arrest now codified in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE"). PACE requires "reasonable grounds 
for suspecting" to support an arrest119 and tightly regulates detention 
prior to lodging a formal charge. Normally, arrestees must be released 
or charged within twenty-four hours.120 A supervising police officer 
can extend the period of initial detention, but only for an additional 
twelve hours. Further detention without charge must be authorized by 
a judge and cannot exceed a total of ninety-six hours from the initial 
moment of arrest.121 Once a formal charge is lodged (no later than 
ninety-six hours after arrest), the accused has a right to bail (subject to 
117. Magna Carta, 1215, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (Eng.). 
118. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
119. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 § 25(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter PACE]; see 
David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 
91, 95-98 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). 
120. The twenty-four-hour period begins to run from the moment of arrest or the 
moment when the individual arrived at the police station, whichever occurred first. PACE, 
supra note 1 19, § 41; Feldman, supra note 1 19, at 100. 
121. PACE, supra note 119, §§ 43, 44; Feldman, supra note 1 19, at 100-01; see ANTONIO 
VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 
30 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). The standard for extended detention is a showing that 
continued detention is "necessary to enable evidence of a 'serious arrestable offence' to be 
secured (usually by questioning) or preserved, and that the investigation is being conducted 
'diligently and expeditiously.' " Feldman, supra note 119, at 100 (quoting PACE, supra note 
119, § 42). By comparison, a suspect arrested without a warrant in the United States cannot 
be held for more than forty-eight hours prior to a judicial determination of probable cause. 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
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exceptions), and the case must be brought to trial expeditiously, 
though specific time limits are not fixed by law.122 
b. Emergency powers: the World Wars. During both world wars, 
despite the almost religious prestige of habeas corpus, the government 
assumed detention powers that were essentially unchecked. 
Regulation 14B, promulgated in 1915, allowed the Home Secretary to 
order the internment of any person, if it appeared to him "that for 
securing the public safety or the defence of the realm [detention] is 
expedient in view of the (person's] hostile origin or association."123 
The only remedy available to an internee was to petition a 
government committee which could only recommend, not order his 
release. Internees failed in their attempt to use habeas corpus as a 
check on this scheme. The House of Lords said it was "necessary in a 
time of great public danger to entrust great powers to [the executive]" 
and accepted on faith that "such powers will be reasonably 
exercised. "124 
The World War II powers were similar. Regulation 18B, 
promulgated on the first day of the war, gave the Home Secretary 
power to detain any person if satisfied that detention was necessary to 
prevent actions "prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the 
realm."125 Shortly thereafter, when members of Parliament expressed 
concern that the broadly worded Regulation could permit abuse, it 
was amended to require that the Home Secretary have "reasonable 
cause to believe."126 As before, detainees were allowed to appeal to a 
committee which could only recommend release. 
During the war, almost 2000 individuals were detained without 
trial under Regulation 18B. Many were British citizens, including 
prominent leaders of right-wing, fascist organizations and even a 
sitting member of Parliament.127 Far from scrutinizing these cases, the 
courts held that "reasonable cause" set an entirely subjective standard 
and that a detention order could be challenged only by establishing 
bad faith or mistaken identity,128 a showing that was virtually 
impossible to make.129 
122. See Feldman, supra note 1 19, at 116-17. 
123. VERCHER, supra note 121, at 10. 
124. Rex v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, 268-69. 
125. See A.W . BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS 65 (1992). 
126. Id. (quoting Emergency Powers (Defence) General Regulations, 1939, Stat. R. & 
0., No. 1681, 18B (Detention Orders)). 
127. DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (1997); SIMPSON, supra note 125, at 133-14, 174-79, 
222. 
128. E.g. , Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, 206. 
129. SIMPSON, supra note 125, at 362; see JACKSON, supra note 127, at 46-47. 
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Regulation 18B left a mixed legacy. As a signal of the 
government's determination to fight on at all cost in the dark days of 
June 1940, it probably helped build morale (though other means might 
have served as well), and it may have prevented a few pro-German 
sympathizers from acts of sabotage or espionage. Yet even during the 
war, it became clear that the great majority of 18B detainees were 
harmless, that genuine spies were captured by other means, and that 
more limited methods almost certainly would have sufficed to address 
whatever danger the 18B detainees posed.13° Churchill supported 18B 
during the crisis of 1940 but later came to consider it abhorrent. 
Though his Cabinet did not revoke it until the European fighting 
ended, Churchill's assessment in 1943 was not equivocal: "The power 
of the Executive to cast a man into prison without formulating any 
charge known to the law, and particularly to deny him the judgement 
of his peers, is in the highest degree odious and is the foundation of all 
totalitarian government whether Nazi or Communist."131 
c. Emergency powers in Northern Ireland. A regime granting 
similar emergency authority {the Special Powers Act, 1922) was on the 
books from the moment of the Irish partition. Regulations 
promulgated under the Act recognized four forms of extrajudicial 
detention: (1) warrantless arrest for interrogation, allowed for forty­
eight hours with no need for any suspicion at all;132 (2) arrest for 
seventy-two hours on suspicion that the arrestee had committed or 
was about to commit an offense; (3) detention for up to twenty-eight 
days to enable police to complete an investigation; and (4) 
"internment" for an indefinite period on an executive determination 
that "internment was expedient in the interests of the preservation of 
peace."133 Internees were afforded only a narrow avenue· of redress, an 
appeal to an administrative committee with power to recommend (but 
not order) release. The internee had no right to appear before the 
committee, no right to be represented by counsel, and no right to call, 
confront or cross-examine witnesses. 
These were the powers that came into force when the home-rule 
government declared a state of emergency and launched Operation 
Demetrius on August 9, 1971. Eight months later, as soon as home 
rule was suspended, the U.K. government began releasing prisoners 
and announced its intention to phase out executive detention and 
130. For detailed and more nuanced elaboration of these points, see SIMPSON, supra 
note 125, at 409-13. 
131. Id. at frontispiece; see also id. at vii, 408. 
132. It was RUC practice to use this provision to arrest eyewitnesses and others not 
suspected of wrongdoing, who, they believed, could not or would not speak freely unless 
questioned in private. 
133. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'll'lI 81-84; JACKSON, supra note 127, at 35; VERCHER, 
supra note 121, at 19. 
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internment, not because violence was declining (the opposite had 
occurred) but as a means to ease tension and pave the way for a 
negotiated peace.134 
In November 1972 the U.K. government rescinded the detention 
and internment regulations but replaced them with a new regime for 
Northern Ireland that was only mildly more protective of the suspect. 
It preserved the forty-eight-hour and seventy-two-hour arrest 
provisions, and it preserved the essence of the detention and 
internment powers, adding only a largely symbolic new safeguard -
the right, in the existing administrative appeal against internment, to a 
limited adversary hearing before a quasi-independent commissioner.135 
From 1972 through the 1990s the U.K. Parliament renewed the 
Northern Ireland emergency legislation annually. But in response to a 
series of independent assessments of the legislation and its practice, 
Parliament gradually introduced significant restrictions. It allowed the 
internment power to lapse in 1980. In 1984, an independent judicial 
inquiry questioned the fairness and need for arrest powers that 
required no more than subjective suspicion; in response, the special 
arrest powers for Northern Ireland were eliminated in 1987,136 leaving 
available only the emergency powers applicable throughout the U.K. 
(discussed below), which required reasonable suspicion testable in 
court. 
d. Emergency powers in Britain. The Guilford and Birmingham 
bombings of October-November 1974 triggered irresistible demand 
for deploying emergency powers within Britain itself. One member of 
Parliament described the situation as "the greatest threat since the end 
of the Second World War."137 The Home Secretary introduced a bill 
that he characterized as "Draconian" but "fully justified to meet the 
clear and present danger."138 A mere eight days after the Birmingham 
attacks, Parliament had enacted the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 ("PTA"). The "temporary" part 
of the title proved to be a mirage; the Act was renewed at six-month 
and one-year intervals, with little substantive change, for decades. 
134. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II 50; VERCHER, supra note 121, at 17. By November 
1972 there had been no new detentions or internments and the majority of the existing 
prisoners had been released. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II 64. 
135. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II'II 86, 87. Detainees and their counsel were 
granted a limited right to attend the hearing but no right to call or cross-examine witnesses. 
VERCHER, supra note 121, at 20-21 ,  concludes that the attempt to judicialize the procedure 
broke down because of reliance on hearsay evidence and because the power of the Secretary 
of State to intervene made the proceeding "essentially executive (in] character." 
136. See Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'II 19. 
137. WALKER, supra note107, at 22. 
138. Id. at 22. 
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In addition to its provisions relating to detention, the PT A 
prohibited support for proscribed organizations "concerned in 
terrorism," modestly relaxed the rules governing searches, and 
authorized the exclusion from Britain of U.K. citizens ordinarily 
resident in Northern Ireland (and vice versa) when the person appears 
to be a person "concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism."139 
The PT A granted new powers of arrest and detention but retained 
many safeguards that had become standard in British law 
enforcement. Unlike the emergency regulations for Northern Ireland, 
it required an arresting officer to have "reasonable grounds." The 
most important departure from ordinary safeguards was the provision 
extending the period of detention without judicial control. In contrast 
to the British benchmark for ordinary cases (twenty-four or at most 
thirty-six hours from arrest to first judicial appearance), the Act gave 
forty-eight hours and allowed a cabinet-rank official to prolong that 
period for five more days, for a total of up to seven days' detention 
prior to judicial review.140 
The principal goal of the new detention power was to afford more 
time for interrogation without outside interference: 
[M]any of those . . .  detain[ed] under the Act adopt an attitude during 
interview which is quite different from that of most other suspected 
criminals; some of them, for example, show an indifference to their own 
personal future and a refusal to co-operate in any way. This . . .  makes 
the task of the police in interviewing [the suspect] more difficult.141 
The maximum period of pre-charge detention (seven days) was only 
three days longer than the ninety-six-hour maximum permitted under 
PACE.142 Nonetheless, the system drew criticism because no criteria 
were specified for the decision to extend detention and no judge 
participated in approving it.143 
At the outset there were few safeguards to guarantee proper 
treatment of detainees. But abuses brought to light by periodic 
139. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, §§ 1(1), 4(1), 5(1) 
(Eng.) (hereinafter PTA); WALKER, supra note 107, at 139-42. Exclusion orders were 
described as "largely preventative in conception, but punitive in execution." W. L. Twining, 
Emergency Powers and Criminal Process: The Diplock Report, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 406, 415. 
140. Additional emergency legislation applicable only in Northern Ireland partially 
overlaps with the PT A, but generally grants fewer special powers than the PT A. WALKER, 
supra note 107, at 129-31 .  
141.  WALKER, supra note 107, at 126 (quoting LORD SHACKLETON, REVIEW OF THE 
OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS ) ACTS 1974 
AND 1976, Cmnd. 7324, para. 72 (1978)). 
142. Under PACE, an arrestee can be detained a maximum of thirty-six hours prior to 
his first judicial appearance, and the court can approve detention for an additional sixty 
hours, prior to charge. See supra text accompanying notes 120-121.  
143. WALKER, supra note 107, at 125-26. 
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independent reviews144 prompted the adoption of administrative 
safeguards applicable only to terrorism suspects (greater supervision 
by senior officers, "meticulous documentation," greater medical 
supervision, and a code of conduct for interrogators).145 In certain 
respects, however, terrorism suspects were accorded fewer rights than 
other detainees. Interrogations were not routinely recorded, as they 
are in the case of other suspects, and access to outside assistance was 
restricted. Under PACE an arrestee must be permitted access to a 
solicitor within thirty-six hours. But for terrorism suspects, the PT A 
allowed an additional twelve hours' delay and authorized police to 
monitor meetings between the detainee and his lawyer. Although the 
power to monitor consultations was not widely used, police routinely 
chose to isolate terrorism suspects from counsel for the maximum 
forty-eight-hour period.146 
The added power to detain suspects incommunicado might seem 
trivial compared to that now claimed in the U.S. (twelve additional 
hours in Britain - for a total of forty-eight hours - versus two years 
or longer in the United States). Nonetheless, the British measures 
were controversial. Many argued that the forty-eight-hour delay was 
excessive, even in the context of the acute terrorist threat, and that the 
power to overhear lawyer-client conversations, though available only 
to a police inspector not connected to the investigation, transformed 
access to counsel "into either a trap or a hollow ritual."147 
The special powers were extensively used. For the decade 1974-84, 
the PT A was invoked to support nearly 6000 detentions in Britain, 
with half of them concentrated in the years 1975-77. Yet less than ten 
percent of the detentions in Britain extended beyond the initial forty­
eight-hour period. In two of the busiest years, 1976-77, there were 
more than 1900 detentions, but only eighty-eight exceeded forty-eight 
hours.148 The pattern in Northern Ireland was different. For the same 
decade, there were 4360 PT A detentions, a number vastly larger 
(relative to population) than the detention figure for Britain. RUC use 
of PT A detentions powers became especially common in the early 
1980s, with nearly 1000 detentions in each of the years 1982-84. And 
unlike the pattern for detentions in Britain, nearly three-quarters of 
the detentions in Northern Ireland exceeded forty-eight hours.149 
144. Semi-independent government reports on the implementation of the emergency 
legislation were produced, inter alia, in 1978 (the Shackleton Report), 1979 (the Bennett 
Report), and 1982 (the Jellicoe Report). WALKER, supra note 107, at 24-27, 126-27. 
145. Id. at 127. 
146. Id. at 129. 
147. Id. 
148. WALKER, supra note 107, at 133. 
149. Id. at 135. 
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3. The U.K. Courts 
Judges sitting in Northern Ireland initially showed little inclination 
to restrict the detention effort. Prisoners had an unquestioned right to 
file habeas petitions and get hearings. Only on rare occasions did they 
succeed in winning release. 
As a practical matter, it was difficult to get a case heard before the 
three-day or seven-day limits at which the police had to charge or 
release the arrestee in any event.1so To that extent, habeas corpus was 
often, in practice, a meaningless remedy.1s1 Nonetheless, some 
detainees succeeded in getting habeas petitions heard almost 
immediately;1s2 others sought to vindicate their rights by suits for false 
imprisonment. 
Judicial remedies, though far from perfect, were increasingly 
effective in setting standards that executive authorities felt compelled 
to respect. The judges had insisted from the beginning that some 
access to courts must remain a reality.1s3 And over time, with varying 
degrees of legislative support or acquiescence, the courts played a key 
role in compelling respect for three substantive rights - notification 
of the grounds for arrest; prompt access to counsel; and judicial review 
of the reasonableness of the arresting officer's suspicions. 
a. Notification. From the earliest cases growing out of Operation 
Demetrius, courts made clear that although the emergency regulations 
left judges no room to consider reasonableness,1s4 they would intervene 
in cases of proven bad faith or failure to follow formal requirements.1ss 
And they read into the regulations a requirement, drawn from the 
common-law notification rule,1s6 that an arrestee be informed "in 
unambiguous terms" of the reasons for his arrest. Thus, if the arresting 
officer could not remember what he had said at the time of arrest, the 
arrest was invalid, and the affected detainee was granted an order to 
"be discharged forthwith."1s7 
The government challenged the notification rule head-on, arguing 
that it "ought not to be applied to an arrest under the Special Powers 
Act [in a] national emergency when the overriding considerations 
ought to be the safety of the State and the speed and efficiency of the 
150. See id. at 123. 
151. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, '!I'll 82-84. 
152. E.g., Ex parte Lynch, N. Ir. L.R. 126 (Q.B. 1980}. 
153. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II'II 219-220 (noting in 1978 the availability of 
"valuable, if limited, review effected by the courts"). 
154. McKee v. Chief Constable, 1 W.L.R. 1358 (H.L. 1984). 
155. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, '!I'll 82-84. 
156. Christie v. Leachinsky, A.C. 573 (H.L. 1947). 
157. E.g., In re McElduff, N. Ir. L.R. 1 ,  26 (Q.B. 1972). 
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arrest." The courts were unpersuaded: "No such exigency has been 
proved as would involve the abandonment of [this] elementary 
requirement of the common law . . . .  "158 
b. Reasonableness. During the years 1971-87, terrorism suspects 
arrested in Northern Ireland could be held for seventy-two hours on 
the basis of entirely subjective suspicion. During those years, 
therefore, courts had no occasion to review the substantive basis for 
arrest, at least during the initial seventy-two-hour period. Nonetheless, 
judicial review of reasonableness remained available for all arrests in 
Britain and for arrests in Northern Ireland that law enforcement 
officers chose to effect under the PT A, which was applicable 
throughout the UK. And despite the PT A's reasonableness 
requirement, the RUC frequently relied upon it, rather than the 
legislation limited to Northern Ireland, because it permitted four days' 
additional detention (seven rather than three) and because RUC 
officers reportedly felt confident that courts would consider their 
honestly held suspicions to be reasonable.159 
Beginning in 1987, as a result of legislation, all arrests (including 
those in Northern Ireland) had to be founded on reasonable grounds 
subject to scrutiny in court.160 No doubt judicial review was typically 
deferential, and it was hampered in any event by the police privilege 
to protect confidential sources.161 Nonetheless courts sometimes did 
hold arrests void on the ground that the underlying suspicions were 
unreasonable, and significant damages were awarded for false 
imprisonment.162 
c. Access to counsel and others. Under PACE suspects in ordinary 
criminal investigations normally have access to counsel from the 
moment of arrest, a right to have a relative or friend notified 
immediately, and the right to have counsel present during 
interrogation.163 The emergency provisions modified these rights in 
four significant respects. They permitted police to deny terrorism 
suspects access to counsel for forty-eight hours after arrest; they 
permitted a forty-eight-hour delay in notifying the suspect's relatives; 
after an initial consultation with counsel, they guaranteed a right to 
158. Kelly v. Faulkner, N. Ir. L.R. 31 ,  36 (Q.B. 1973); see also VERCHER, supra note 121,  
at 57-59. 
159. See Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'lI 19. 
160. See text accompanying note 136, supra. 
161. As a result of the privilege of confidentiality, Vercher concluded in 1992 that 
"arrests are de facto unchallengeable in court." VERCHER, supra note 121, at 60-61. 
162. E.g., Van Hout v. Chief Constable, N. Ir. (1984 Q.B.) (awarding £  2500 for 12  days 
of detention). 
163. PACE, supra note 1 19, § 65; Averill v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, 'lI 36 
(2000). 
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further consultation only at forty-eight-hour intervals; and they denied 
the right to have counsel present at the police interview itself. 164 
Detainees nonetheless retained "an absolute and legally enforceable 
right to consult a solicitor after 48 hours from the time of arrest."165 
Though delayed access to counsel became commonplace, 
significant checks on arbitrary police action remained. Counter­
terrorism investigators kept precise time sheets, and in the reported 
cases, suspects typically did gain access to counsel at the forty-eight­
hour point - or at most a few hours later - even when they were still 
successfully resisting interrogation.166 Many suspects were allowed 
access to their solicitors sooner, even in important cases.167 Access to a 
doctor of the detainee's choice and the right to inform a relative or 
friend about the arrest were preserved on a similar basis.168 
A judicial check was also operative - even during the first forty­
eight hours. Because access to counsel could be denied only on 
"reasonable grounds" to believe counsel would impede the 
investigation, delay could be challenged in court and was, at least in 
theory, subject to judicial scrutiny.169 The burden to establish 
"reasonable grounds" was (in theory) on the prosecutionY0 At least 
one independent assessment concluded that these checks were not 
purely theoretical: " [J]udicial review has been shown to be a speedy 
and effective manner of ensuring that access to a solicitor is not 
arbitrarily withheld."171 In many cases, British courts found delayed 
access to counsel unreasonable, even within the initial forty-eight-hour 
period, and granted immediate access to a solicitor.172 
164. See Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, 'lI 35. 
165. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 64 (1994); see 
also WALKER, supra note 107, at 127 (finding an "unconditional right of access to a lawyer 
after each forty-eight hours of detention"). 
166. Suspect Brannigan was granted access to his solicitor at the forty-eight hour point, 
though his interrogation had not borne fruit. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 10. John 
Murray, who also refused to speak, was allowed access to his solicitor after 49 hours. Murray 
v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 'lI 11 (1996). Gerard Magee confessed after about 
thirty-six hours in custody, but was not allowed to meet his solicitor until fifty-five hours 
after arrest. Magee v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 822, 'lI'lI 8, 12 (2000). 
167. Liam Averill, suspected (and ultimately convicted) in a multiple assassination, was 
allowed access to his solicitor after an unfruitful interrogation and a total of twenty-four 
hours in custody. Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, 'lI 11 .  Patrick McBride, an uncooperative 
suspect, was allowed to see his solicitor on the day of his arrest and again forty-eight hours 
later. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 11 .  
168. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 24. In addition, i t  was standard practice, at 
least after 1979, to conduct a medical examination before interviewing a suspect and at 
frequent intervals thereafter. Id. 
169. Id. 'lI 24. 
170. Id. 'lI 64. 
171. Id. 'lI 64. 
172. Id. 'lI 24. 
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Overall, on matters of national security the U.K. courts made only 
modest efforts to control executive action. But the scope of judicial 
review gradually expanded over time, and the mere possibility of 
judicial intervention did restrain to some degree the rather wide 
discretion that executive authorities enjoyed in practice.173 Judicial 
remedies in the U.K. courts were soon reinforced, moreover, by the 
oversight functions.of the European Court of Human Rights. 
4. International Constraints: The European Convention on Human 
Rights 
Britain's obligations as a signatory of the European Convention on 
Human Rights are not j ust theoretical. Unlike many international 
human-rights documents, the European Convention not only defines 
basic rights but provides institutions to enforce them. The European 
Convention created an international court with jurisdiction to hear 
citizens' complaints against their own governments and to order states 
to provide remedies to injured individuals. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) cannot reverse the judgment of a national 
court, but it can grant money damages to injured parties, and after its 
decisions are rendered, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe is charged with verifying that offending laws and practices of 
member nations are corrected.174 For readers unfamiliar with the 
context in which U.K. actions came under scrutiny at the European 
level, the Appendix to this Article describes the structure of the 
European Convention, its overall system of criminal procedure 
guarantees, and the ECHR's role in enforcing them. 
The ECHR has played an increasingly active role in enforcing 
Convention requirements not only in the U.K. but in other European 
nations, including Germany and Turkey, where persistent terrorism 
has put human-rights norms under pressure. In connection with U.K. 
counter-terrorism efforts, the European Court has been especially 
active in helping guarantee respect for three components of due 
process, the requirements that detainees be brought to court promptly; 
that detentions be supported by reasonable suspicion; and that the 
"courts" entrusted with implementing these checks be independent 
bodies of a judicial character. 
a. Independence and judicial character. Throughout the European 
Convention are rules requiring action or approval by "a court," "a 
judge," or an official entrusted with "judicial power." The ECHR case 
173. See generally Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II 220; VERCHER, supra note 121, at 65-
73, 85. 
174. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, art. 46, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 246 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. 
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law has drawn from these terms a series of demanding requirements. 
For a tribunal to qualify as a court, it must be "independen[t] of the 
executive" and must afford "the guarantees of judicial procedure."175 
The court has applied the requirement of independence not only to 
civil and criminal courts but also to military tribunals, a focal point of 
current controversies in the United States. The ECHR ruled that 
courts-martial, as traditionally structured in European armies, were 
unacceptable because they permitted trial of soldiers by judges serving 
within the military chain of command.176 In British army procedure 
(similar to our own) court-martial judges were "subordinate in rank" 
to the convening officer and were "directly or ultimately under his 
command."177 Moreover, a court-martial ruling "was not effective until 
ratified by [the convening officer], and he had the power to vary the 
sentence imposed."178 Such a body could not be a "court" within the 
meaning of the Convention: The subordinate status of court-martial 
members created "doubts about the tribunal's independence and 
impartiality"; moreover, "the power to give a binding decision which 
may not be altered by a non-judicial authority is inherent in the very 
notion of 'tribunal' . . . .  "179 As required by these rulings, court-martial 
procedure was extensively revised in British and other European 
armies.180 And the safeguards available to active-duty soldiers carried 
over to issues affecting suspected IRA or civilian terrorists. 
To qualify as a "court," a tribunal also must afford "the guarantees 
of judicial procedure," which means "guarantees appropriate to the 
kind of deprivation of liberty in question. "181 In civil commitment, for 
example, the stakes are analogous to criminal punishment, and 
therefore, the ECHR reasoned, the procedures must be analogous to 
those of a criminal trial. An adversarial hearing before an independent 
175. De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 'l! 78 (1971). 
176. De Jong, Baljet & van den Brink v. The Netherlands, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 'lI 47 
(1984); Schiesser v. Switzerland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 414, 'II 31 (1979). In related rulings, the 
Court held that a military judge could not satisfy Convention requirements if he could not 
order release but only recommend it to higher military authority, De Jong, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
20, 'II 48; or if he could later become involved as a prosecuting officer, and thereby lose the 
required "independen[ce) of the parties." Id. 'l! 49. 
177. Findlay v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221, 'l!'II 75-76 (1997). With respect 
to courts-martial in the United States, 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1998), confers on the 
convening officer the authority to select subordinate officers as courts-martial members. 
178. Id. 'II 77. 
179. Id. 'l!'l! 76-77. 
180. For Britain, see Armed Forces Act, 1996, c. 16 (Eng.), discussed in Findlay, 24 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 221, 'l!'l! 52-57, 60, and in Cooper v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 171, 'l!'l! 
105-134 (2003). For the Netherlands, see E-mail from the Nico Keijzer, retired Justice, 
Netherlands Supreme Court, to the author (Aug. 24 & Aug. 25, 2003) (on file with author). 
See generally EUROPEAN MILITARY LAW SYSTEMS (Georg Nolte ed., 2003). 
181. De Wilde, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 'II 76 (1971). 
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magistrate did not qualify as "judicial," the court reasoned, because 
the proceeding did not provide for the full panoply of criminal trial 
safeguards.182 Though the ECHR has not yet had occasion to consider 
a process for detaining an "enemy combatant," that situation would 
seem to pose a similar problem of ostensibly non-punitive but 
potentially lifetime confinement. In contrast to the apparent position 
of the Hamdi plurality,183 the European Court seems prepared to insist 
that such a process afford safeguards fully comparable to those of the 
criminal trial. 
The requirements of independence and appropriate procedure 
posed one of many Convention problems for the Northern Ireland 
emergency laws. Under regulations in force from 1971-80, suspects 
interned were granted an appeal to a review committee, but this body 
was not independent of the executive branch, its decisions were 
advisory only, and it denied many traditional procedural guarantees.184 
On all three grounds, the ECHR held, the review committee could not 
qualify as the "court" that the Convention required.185 The U.K. 
government argued that the availability of habeas corpus offered an 
answer to this problem. Habeas courts were "independent," followed 
traditional judicial procedure, could order release, and actually had 
ordered the release some detained terror suspects.186 But because the 
emergency regime blocked habeas courts from granting bail or 
determining whether the basis for detention was "reasonable," the 
ECHR ruled that their powers were "not sufficiently wide in scope, 
taking into account the purpose [of the judicial inquiry required by] 
the Convention."187 
b. Prompt access to courts: the initial approach. Less than four 
months after the launching of Operation Demetrius, the Irish 
Republic invoked the Convention to challenge the treatment of 
suspected IRA detainees.188 After extensive factual investigation, the 
182. Id. 'll'll 79-80. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. It should be noted, however, that the 
Hamdi plurality's apparent approval of diluted safeguards was limited to the context of 
battlefield seizures, a context that the ECHR (unlike the Israeli Supreme Court, see supra 
Part Ill.A.6) has yet to consider. The Hamdi plurality expressed no view on the procedures 
required for alleged "enemy combatants" seized outside a zone of active military operations. 
See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 133-135. 
185. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 200. 
186. See, e.g. , In re McElduff, N. Ir. L.R. 1 (Q.B. 1972). 
187. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 200. 
188. The complaint encompassed those arrested in the initial sweep and others detained 
while the case remained under investigation: nearly 3000 individuals detained from August 
1971 through March 1972, and over 200 individuals allegedly subjected to severe abuse while 
in custody. Id. 'll'll 81, 93. 
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ECHR rendered its decision in December 1977. The "troubles" had by 
no means receded. For Northern Ireland alone, the death toll then 
stood at well over 1000.189 Lethal violence was still occurring daily.190 
The Irish complaint focused on brutality in interrogations and on 
the practice of extended detention without judicial review. The court's 
decision in Ireland v. United Kingdom is widely known for its 
unequivocal condemnation of the so-called "five techniques" of 
stressful interrogation (hooding, sleep deprivation, continuous loud 
noise, deprivation of food and water, and forcing detainees to remain 
standing in awkward positions). These, the court ruled, constitute 
inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention. They can never be permitted, even in the gravest 
national-security emergency.191 
With respect to extrajudicial detention, the court ruled that 
practices in Northern Ireland violated numerous Convention 
requirements. Mere witnesses and bystanders could be held for up to 
forty-eight hours, solely for interrogation (an impermissible purpose); 
suspected offenders were not brought to court "promptly" or at all; 
they were not afforded the right to have "the lawfulness of [their] 
detention . . . decided speedily by a court"; and the advisory 
committee's review of internment "did not afford the fundamental 
guarantees inherent in the notion of 'court. ' "192 
But within days of launching Operation Demetrius, the U.K. had 
filed a formal notice of derogation with respect to all these 
Convention requirements.193 Under the European Convention system, 
signatory states can suspend their obligation to comply with certain 
(not all) of the Convention's requirements - but only when there is a 
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation," and even then, 
only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation."194 Given the circumstances prevailing in Northern Ireland, 
the existence of a "public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation" - in particular, its territorial integrity - was beyond dispute. 
189. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'JI 12. 
190. The court noted, for example, that from January through June 1976, there had been 
173 murders (virtually one every day) and 770 other persons had been injured in acts of 
terrorism in Northern Ireland. Id. 'lI 76. 
191. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 96. Before the court, the British did not attempt 
to defend the five techniques. Although a 1972 government commission had concluded that 
with sufficient safeguards, the techniques need not be prohibited, the government accepted 
the dissenting commissioner's view that the techniques were never morally justifiable, even 
in emergency conditions. As a result, the government had renounced the use of the five 
techniques and committed never to re-introduce them. See id. 'll'll 100-02. 
192. Id. 'JI 200 (citation omitted because of vagueness in the original source). 
193. Id. 'JI 79. 
194. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(1), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. at 
232. For discussion of this power of "derogation," see the Appendix, infra. 
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The Irish complaint centered on whether the means adopted were 
"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." The issue, 
therefore, touched the central dilemma of checks and balances in a 
national emergency: to what extent is it appropriate for courts to 
"second guess" judgments of national security and military necessity 
made by the executive at times of crisis. 
The ECHR's answer was nuanced, but in this early confrontation 
with executive emergency measures, its conclusions were ultimately 
deferential. The court noted that national authorities were in a better 
position to judge the circumstances; that they were accordingly 
entitled to a wide berth; but that: 
the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect. The Court, 
[being] responsible for ensuring the observance of the States' 
engagements . . .  , is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone 
beyond the 'extent strictly required . . . .  ' The domestic margin of 
appreciation [the State's claim to deference] is thus accompanied by a 
European supervision.195 
In the end the court accepted that all the detention measures were 
strictly necessary. It stressed the extraordinary character of the 
security situation, the strictly limited periods allowed for detention in 
most circumstances, the "valuable, if limited, review effected by the 
courts," and above all, that legislation and practice have: 
evolved in the direction of increasing respect for individual liberty . . . .  
When a State is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to 
accomplish everything at once . . . .  The interpretation of [derogation 
requirements] must leave a place for progressive adaptations.196 
c. Prompt access to courts: the evolving standard. Over the next 
twenty years the ECHR frequently revisited the requirement of 
prompt judicial review, and it grew increasingly willing to question the 
U.K. emergency detention practices. During the early 1980s, when a 
series of temporary truces reduced the fatality rate to some degree, 
the U.K. withdrew its derogation and announced that henceforth it 
would fully respect Convention requirements.197 It was quickly 
charged with non-compliance. Terence Brogan was arrested in 
September 1984. The day after his arrest, authorities invoked the PT A 
emergency power to extend detention for an additional five days. 
Brogan remained silent throughout his interrogation and was allowed 
to see his solicitor on the second and fourth days after arrest. He was 
never taken to court and was released without charges after five and a 
195. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'll 207. 
196. Id. 'll'll 219-220. 
197. See Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 'l[ 48 (1988). 
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half days of detention. Together with three others detained under 
similar circumstances, 198 Brogan brought suit in the European Court. 
The issue again was whether U.K. practice met the requirement 
that detainees "be brought promptly before a judge" in order to have 
"the lawfulness of [their] detention . . .  decided speedily by a court."199 
None of the Brogan complainants had been brought to court at all; 
they had been released first. If their release was "prompt," they would 
have no cause to complain, but " [i]f the arrested person is not released 
promptly, he is entitled to a prompt appearance before a judge . . . .  "200 
The question in Brogan therefore was whether release within four to 
six days could be considered "prompt." 
The court ruled that it  could not - that even the shortest of the 
four periods of detention (four days) was excessive. Its analysis, 
dramatically at odds with the arguments for incommunicado detention 
now pressed in the United States, is worth quoting at length:201 
[Article 5] enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection 
of the individual against arbitrary interferences by the State with his right 
to liberty. Judicial control of interferences by the executive with the 
individual's right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee 
embodied in Article 5 . . . .  Judicial control is implied by the rule of law, 
"one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society" . . .  . 
[Special circumstances] can never be taken to the point of . . .  effectively 
negativing the State's obligation to ensure a prompt release or a prompt 
appearance before a judicial authority . . . .  
The investigation of terrorist offences undoubtedly presents the 
authorities with special problems . . . . [T]he context of terrorism in 
Northern Ireland has the effect of prolonging the period during which 
the authorities may . . . keep a person suspected of serious terrorist 
offences in custody before bringing him before a judge . . . .  However, 
they cannot justify . . . dispensing altogether with "prompt" judicial 
control. [In the present case,] even the shortest of the four periods of 
detention . . .  falls outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by 
the [Convention]. To attach such importance to the special features of 
this case as to justify so lengthy a period of detention [four days] without 
appearance before a judge or other judicial officer would . . .  impair[] the 
very essence of the right . . . .  The undoubted fact that the arrest and 
detention of the applicants were inspired by the legitimate aim of 
198. All four detainees were allowed to see their solicitors after forty-eight hours, and 
all refused to answer questions. The periods of detention for the other three totaled six-and­
a-half, four-and-a-half, and four days, respectively. Id. 'll'll 11-24. 
199. European Convention on Human Rights arts. 5-l(c), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. 
at 5-3, 5-4. 
200. Brogan, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 'l! 58. 
201. Id. 'll'll 58-62. 
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protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on its own 
sufficient . . . .  
Within days of the Brogan decision, the U.K. announced its hope 
to comply with the ECHR judgment by establishing a procedure for 
detention to be reviewed and (where appropriate) authorized by a 
judge. But the government quickly concluded against involving the 
courts. Its stated rationale was that detention was often based on 
confidential information that could not be revealed to the suspect or 
his counsel, and that allowing a court to consider information not 
presented to the detainee "would represent a radical departure from 
the principles which govern judicial proceedings in this country and 
could seriously affect public trust and confidence in the independence 
of the judiciary."202 Paradoxically, the government in effect concluded 
that public trust was best furthered by maintaining a judiciary with 
unvarnished independence but virtually no power to use it in this 
context. It chose to respond to Brogan not by conforming to the 
court's conception of "promptness" but instead by once again 
invoking its derogation power.203 
That step, however, simply triggered another level of ECHR 
scrutiny. Two suspects arrested soon after the derogation brought suit 
against the U.K. One saw his lawyer on the day of arrest and again 
two days later; the other saw his solicitor only once, having been 
denied access to a solicitor for the first forty-eight hours. Both were 
interrogated persistently, and both were released before making any 
incriminating statement - one after six and a half days, the other after 
four days, six hours, and twenty-five minutes.204 Even the shorter 
detention exceeded (by twenty-five minutes) a detention period held 
impermissible in Brogan. 
Given Brogan, the detentions obviously violated Article 5. But in 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, sixteen years before, the ECHR had 
upheld a far more sweeping derogation from Article 5. There was no 
doubt that the Northern Ireland situation continued to represent a 
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation."205 And since the 
broad detention powers and slender safeguards of the earlier case 
were found to be "strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation,"206 the far milder powers asserted after Brogan might have 
seemed a simple matter to uphold. 
202 Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, i 32. 
203. Id. at 552. The U.K. derogation was formally communicated on December 23, 1988, 
approximately three weeks after Brogan had been decided. Id. i 31. 
204. Id. n 10-11 .  
205. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(1), supra note 174, 213 U.N.TS. 
at 232. 
206. Id. 
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Instead, by the early 1990s, the ECHR conceptions of necessity 
and judicial deference had changed. The court viewed the U.K. regime 
of extra-judicial detention for seven days (a fraction of the twenty­
eight-day detentions upheld in 1977) as a highly suspect departure 
from rule-of-law norms, requiring the strictest scrutiny. After close 
examination, the court found that the more recent and relatively 
narrow U.K. detention practices, even when coupled with extensive 
safeguards, just barely passed muster. It accepted that some power of 
extended detention was necessary in combating terrorism. And it was 
willing to defer to the U.K. government's view that in the common-law 
adversarial system, the appearance of judicial independence would be 
compromised if judges were in effect making decisions of an executive 
nature (detention) and considering confidential information when 
doing so. Finally, and decisively, the court concluded that the U.K. 
derogation was tolerable only because the promptness requirement 
was exceeded only by a few days and was accompanied by strong 
safeguards to prevent incommunicado detention or other abuse. 
The court has made clear that boundaries of this sort cannot be 
stretched very far. In cases involving the Turkish government's 
attempt to combat high levels of lethal terrorism in its Kurdish region, 
the court held that Turkey's derogation - invoked to support a 
regime of fourteen days' extra-judicial detention - was impermissible. 
There was "no speedy remedy of habeas corpus," and safeguards 
against incommunicado detention were insufficient because there 
were "no legally enforceable rights of access to a lawyer, doctor, friend 
or relative. "207 Moreover, the duration of extra-judicial detention 
(fourteen days) was enough in itself to defeat the attempted 
derogation and was therefore impermissible even during a "public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation. "208 That "exceptionally 
long" period, the court held, left the suspect unacceptably vulnerable 
to arbitrary deprivation of liberty and more serious abuse.209 
In contrast, the U.K. derogation passed the test of strict necessity 
because extra-judicial detention could not exceed seven days and was 
well insulated against the risk of abuse. Specifically, the court found 
six significant safeguards:210 
207. Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 'JI 81 (1996). 
208. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(1), supra note 174, 213 U.N.TS. 
at 232. 
209. Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 'll'll 78, 81 (1996); see also Sakik v. Turkey, 
26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 662, 'll'll 41-46 (1997). 
210. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI'lI 62-64. Though it did not stress the point 
explicitly, the Court was almost certainly influenced by the fact that authorities kept detailed 
(apparently accurate) records relating to the treatment of each detainee and their 
compliance with the safeguards that the court enumerated. 
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- habeas corpus was available to test to lawfulness of the original 
arrest; 
- "detainees have an absolute and legally enforceable right to 
consult a solicitor after 48 hours"; 
- detainees had the right to inform a friend or relative about their 
detention; 
- detainees had frequent access to a doctor; 
- even within the first forty-eight hours, there were limits on 
government power to block access to counsel; and 
- in practice as well as in theory, "judicial review has been shown to 
be a speedy and effective manner of ensuring that access to a 
solicitor is not arbitrarily withheld" during the first forty-eight 
hours. 
d. Reasonable suspicion. Even when an arrestee is released within 
forty-eight hours, the arrest itself is a significant deprivation of liberty. 
Under the European Convention, the arrest is invalid from the outset 
unless based on reasonable suspicion, and the arrestee must be 
afforded the right to have "the lawfulness of his detention . . .  decided 
speedily by a court. "21 1  As interpreted by the ECHR, the 
reasonableness requirement "forms an essential part of the safeguard 
against arbitrary arrest and detention . . . .  [A] 'reasonable suspicion' 
presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy 
an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed 
the offence."212 
Until 1987, the U.K. emergency powers permitted arrest on 
subjective suspicion, a clear violation of the European Convention. As 
a result, suspects arrested under the emergency laws were able to 
claim violations of the Convention even when they had been released 
within forty-eight hours. Because no U.K. court had passed on 
"reasonableness" in such cases, the ECHR had to consider that issue 
de novo, and in several cases it held arrests illegal for lack of 
reasonable suspicion.213 After 1987, reasonableness became a 
requirement under U.K. law, but the European Court's conception of 
reasonableness continued to set a standard that U.K. courts were in 
effect encouraged to respect. 
The ECHR decisions on "reasonableness" acknowledge several 
factors placing terrorist crime in "a special category": large numbers of 
lives are at risk, and police often have to use information that cannot 
be revealed without putting an informant's life in jeopardy. 
211.  European Convention on Human Rights arts. 5-4, supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. 
at 232. 
212. Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'II 32. 
213. E.g. , Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157. 
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Nonetheless, the European Court has largely rejected significant 
departures from conventional criminal justice processes and standards 
- unlike the Hamdi plurality, which seems willing to countenance 
significant burden-shifting devices, proof by affidavit and military 
decisionmakers.214 The European court has stressed that "the 
exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the 
notion of 'reasonableness' to the point where the essence of the 
safeguard secured by [the Convention] is impaired."215 
Several ECHR decisions give content to this standard. Bernard 
Fox, Maire Campbell and Samuel Hartley were arrested in February 
and August 1986, questioned, and released after detentions lasting 
forty-four hours in two cases and thirty hours in the third. Police 
suspected Fox and Campbell of gathering intelligence for the IRA and 
suspected Hartley of involvement in an IRA kidnapping. In the 
European Court, the U.K. government noted that both Fox and 
Campbell had previous convictions for explosives offenses, but beyond 
those facts, the government insisted that the suspicions against all 
three rested on "acutely sensitive material" that if disclosed, could 
endanger informants.216 
The case accordingly turned on whether hearsay and confidential 
affidavits can provide a sufficient basis for "reasonable" suspicion. 
The court acknowledged that police cannot be expected to identify 
their informants; on the other hand: 
(T]he Court must be enabled to ascertain whether the essence of the 
safeguard afforded by (the Convention] has been secured. Consequently 
the respondent Government has to furnish at least some facts or 
information capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was 
reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged offence. 
Moreover, 
(t]he fact that Mr Fox and Ms Campbell both have previous convictions 
for acts of terrorism connected with the IRA, although it could reinforce 
a suspicion linking them to the commission of terrorist-type offences, 
cannot form the sole basis of a suspicion justifying their arrest in 1986, 
some seven years later.217 
Accordingly, the court concluded, all three arrests were illegal. 
Four years later, a small difference in facts produced a different 
result. Margaret Murray was arrested on suspicion of raising funds for 
the IRA. She was questioned and released after a total of two hours, 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. Again, however, it should be noted that 
the Hamdi plurality's apparent approval of diluted safeguards was limited to the context of 
battlefield seizures. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
215. Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'lI 32. 
216. Id. 'll 33. 
217. Id. 'll'l! 34, 35. 
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forty-five minutes of detention. She brought suit in the ECHR, 
alleging that her arrest was not based on reasonable suspicion. As in 
Fox, the U.K. government maintained that the suspicions against 
Murray rested primarily on confidential information and could not be 
disclosed without risking lives. But the government also relied on the 
fact that a month before Murray's arrest, two of her brothers had been 
convicted in the United States of purchasing weapons for the IRA, she 
had visited the brothers there, and the circumstances of their offense 
implied collaboration with "trustworthy" persons residing in Northern 
Ireland.218 
To frame its analysis, the court again acknowledged two competing 
concerns: "the use of confidential information is essential in 
combating terrorist violence," but "investigating authorities [cannot] 
have carte blanche . . .  free from effective control . . .  whenever they 
choose to assert that terrorism is involved."219 Though the court gave 
"some credence"220 to the government's claim to have reliable 
information, it insisted that it must be furnished "at least some 
facts . . .  capable of satisfying the Court."221 For a majority of the court, 
the very brief duration of the detention lowered the level of suspicion 
required, and the circumstances of the recent conviction of Murray's 
brothers were sufficient to supply "a plausible and objective basis" for 
suspicion that Murray may have been involved.222 
The ECHR approach to confidential information is simultaneously 
more skeptical and more permissive than that of American courts. The 
European Court apparently gives confidential information, however 
solid, only minimal weight and will never consider such information 
sufficient by itself. But whatever weight such information does get 
comes with no further probing into its nature. U.S. law is different on 
both points. Under the Fourth Amendment, the weight attributed to a 
confidential tip always depends on what police reveal about how the 
informant acquired his information and the grounds police may have 
for believing him.223 But a confidential tip backed by information 
about the reliability of the informant and the basis of his knowledge 
can be sufficient by itself to establish probable cause, without any 
"objective" corroboration to support it.224 
218. Murray, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 193, 'lI 62. 
219. Id. 'lI 58. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 'lI 60. 
222. Id. 'lI 63. Four dissenting judges found the case indistinguishable from Fox, 
Campbell & Hartley and would have ruled the arrest illegal for lack of reasonable suspicion. 
223. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 233-34 (1983). 
224. Id. at 232 n.7; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13, 415 (1969). 
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e. The ECHR Jurisprudence of Emergency Powers. In the 1970s, at 
the outset of its confrontation with the U.K. measures, the ECHR 
proceeded cautiously, as might be expected for a newly minted 
supranational jurisdiction of uncertain authority and legitimacy. Its 
early decisions were deferential and delivered long after the fact.225 It 
declared that internment was unacceptable in the absence of 
substantial safeguards, but then found adequate the U.K. 's early 
regime of paltry protections. The European court apparently was 
content to combine strong rhetoric with wishful thinking about 
realities "on the ground." 
Over time the court gained greater confidence, both generally and 
in national-security matters. The threat of terrorism had scarcely 
receded. It remained acute in Northern Ireland and had spread (for 
unrelated reasons) to other countries throughout Europe. If anything, 
the passage of time may have convinced the court that a "state of 
emergency" had become permanent, and that unbounded judicial 
deference would leave European governments with carte blanche to 
suspend at will the core principles of democracy and the rule of law. 
Whatever the reason, decisions from the late 1980s onward have been 
increasingly bold. The court has interpreted many Convention 
requirements strictly and become much less willing to take 
reassurance from substitute safeguards that sound impressive on paper 
but offer little in practice. As a result, the court set limits of real 
significance, adding important safeguards to measures that had 
already been tempered by legislative and judicial action at the national 
level. 
For the ECHR, no less than for the U.S. Supreme Court, it is 
hazardous to attempt generalizations about the impact of judicial 
precedent on practices on the ground. No doubt some ECHR rulings 
were occasionally honored in the breach. On at least some of the 
issues it addressed, however, the ECHR clearly did prompt real 
change in the sweep of U.K. emergency powers.226 In other instances, 
the availability of judicial review at the European level, with attendant 
possibilities for fact-gathering and public exposure, served in itself as 
some check on executive power and became an important source of 
pressure to limit departures from due-process norms. 
225. For example, its forceful condemnation of the "five techniques" of interrogation 
came many years after the UK government permanently renounced the use of them. 
226. See, for example, A verill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 839, 851, describing U.K. government 
actions to cure violations of Convention right-to-counsel requirements. See generally CONOR 
A. GEARTY, The United Kingdom, in EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 53, 85-86, 101-103 (Conor A. 
Gearty ed., 1997) (discussing substantive legal change implemented in twenty out of the 
twenty-two instances in which the Committee of Ministers had concluded that such change 
was required). 
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IV. CONCLU SION 
In previous national emergencies, U.S. courts diluted normal 
judicial checks to a considerable degree. Nonetheless, they refused to 
condone executive action supplanting the essence of judicial review on 
matters pertaining to detention, particularly the detention of civilians 
and those claiming to be civilians.227 Confronted by acute 
contemporary threats of terrorism, both Britain and Israel likewise 
granted executive and military authorities some extraordinary powers 
but preserved a system of effective checks on the executive and the 
assurance of prompt, fully independent judicial review. 
In the current "war on terrorism,'' however, the U.S. government 
has claimed emergency powers that exceed by very large margins -
indeed, by light years - the executive powers accepted as necessary 
and legitimate in Britain and Israel. Addressing measures far more 
cautious than those deployed by our own government, courts 
nonetheless struck down the executive and military actions as 
unacceptable erosions of necessary checks and balances. 
The fact that other nations reached such conclusions, and indeed 
that our own courts did so in previous national emergencies, cannot by 
itself refute empirical claims about the supposed effectiveness of 
greater executive power and the supposed need for fewer judicial 
checks. We can be confident, however, that contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the emergency powers the U.S. government now claims -
and that the Hamdi plurality seems prepared to accept - are not 
normal, even for a situation of national crisis. The question which 
remains unanswered, and which defenders of present U.S. policy have 
considered unnecessary even to address, is why there would be 
sufficient reason to abandon the wartime checks and balances that we 
ourselves, along with other Western democracies, have until now 
considered an essential component of the rule of law. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44. Even the Court's infamous, now­
discredited Korernatsu decision authorized only removal of Japanese-Americans from 
designated areas on the West Coast, while the Court simultaneously - the same day - held 
that holding them in detention was illegal. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
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APPENDIX: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The European Convention addresses the central criminal 
procedure concerns of the American Bill of Rights, often in similar 
language. Several clauses are less protective than their American 
counterparts; others are more protective.228 But a crucial difference 
from the U.S. Constitution is the Convention system for 
accommodating law-enforcement and national-security needs. Our 
requirement of "due process" invites some balancing of interests, as 
does our Fourth Amendment, which prohibits only "unreasonable" 
searches and seizures. Most other commands of the U.S. Constitution 
are nominally absolute. 
In contrast, the European Convention elaborately defines the 
allowable domain of what we call "balancing." It uses two distinct 
mechanisms - necessity exceptions and formal derogations. Necessity 
can limit the right to privacy and the freedoms of speech, religion and 
assembly.229 Exceptions for necessity are precluded - but formal 
derogations remain available - for the right to fair trial and the 
protections against unjust arrest and detention. 
The room for derogation is hardly surprising; it is exactly what we 
would expect to find, directly or indirectly, in any bill of rights. The 
novelty of the European Convention's derogation mechanism is 
twofold. First, Article 15(2) prohibits derogation from certain 
especially fundamental obligations, e.g. the prohibitions on torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, 
and the death penalty. Contrary to what we might expect, law­
enforcement and national-security emergencies cannot qualify or limit 
the scope of these prohibitions.230 Second, even in areas where the 
228. For example, the Convention grants no right to a jury trial, and indigents have a 
right to free counsel only "when the interests of justice so require," European Convention 
on Human Rights arts. 6-3(c), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, but unlike our Eighth 
Amendment, the Convention expressly prohibits the death penalty in peacetime. Protocol 6 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, Apr. 28, 1983, arts. 1-2, 1496 U.N.T.S. 281. 
229. For example, the right to privacy can be impaired only when "necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic well­
being of the country, for the prevention or disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." European Convention on 
Human Rights art. 8, supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230. As interpreted by the ECHR, 
"democratic" is not equivalent to "majoritarian"; a "democratic" society means one in which 
the majority proceeds with care whenever its actions may affect personal rights that the 
Convention identifies as central to the dignity and flourishing of the individual. E.g., local v. 
Turkey, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449, 480 (1998). Viewing democracy in this way, the ECHR will 
consider a restriction "necessary in a democratic society" only if it meets a "pressing" need 
and is "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." Id. at 481. 
230. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(2), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. 
at 232; Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, supra note 228, 
1496 U.N.T.S. at 281; Protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 
22, 1984, art. 4(3), 1525 U.N.T.S. 195, 196; Protocol 13 to the European Convention 
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European Convention permits derogation, Article 15 circumscribes 
that power and subjects it to oversight by the European Court: 
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from 
the obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law . . . .  
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation 
shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed 
of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor . . . .  
Multiple restrictions are packed into this language. The 
requirement of formal notification and explanation to the Council of 
Europe provides a procedural and political check. And the substantive 
limits are significant. First, even serious law-enforcement exigencies 
are insufficient to trigger the derogation power; the emergency must 
be sufficiently grave to threaten the life of the nation. Second, even an 
overwhelming emergency of this sort does not by itself suspend 
Convention obligations. Nor does such an emergency - one that 
threatens the life of the nation - require automatic deference to the 
necessity judgments of military or executive authorities. When the life 
of a nation is threatened, the European Convention still preserves a 
judicial checking function to assure that steps taken are "strictly 
required" in the judgment of the independent officials (mostly 
nationals of other countries) who sit as judges of the European 
Court.231 
Absent a valid derogation, the Convention requires detention and 
trial to meet detailed requirements. In both civil and criminal cases, 
Article 6 grants the right to a "fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal." In 
criminal cases Article 6 adds a presumption of innocence and grants 
the accused the rights to notice of the charges, assistance of counsel, 
and the ability to call and cross-examine witnesses.232 
on Human Rights, May 3, 2002, art. 2, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/ 
webConvenENG.pdf. 
231 .  Each signatory state in effect nominates one judge. See European Convention on 
Human Rights art. 22, supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236. 
232. Specifically, Article 6 grants the accused the rights: 
. . . [to] be presumed innocent until proved guilty . . . .  
. . . to be informed promptly . . .  and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation . . .  ; 
to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; to defend himself in 
person or through (counsel] of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means . . .  , to be 
given (legal assistance] free when the interests of justice so require; to examine and have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain . . .  witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him . . . .  
Id. at 228. 
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Article 5 limits the purposes for which detention may be ordered. 
The allowable purposes are broad but, unlike our Constitution, do not 
include any potentially legitimate state interest. Detention is 
permissible to prevent the spread of infectious diseases; "for the 
purpose of bringing [a person] before the competent legal authority on 
reasonable suspicion of committing an offense . . .  "; to permit 
deportation or extradition; and "when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent [the person from] committing an offense." The 
list of valid purposes is constrained by the prerequisite of judicially 
testable "reasonableness," and it has one significant omission: 
detention is not permissible simply for purposes of interrogation.233 
Detention for a valid purpose must respect a detainee's rights to be 
informed promptly of the reasons for detention; to have the lawfulness 
of the detention decided speedily by a court; and to have release 
ordered if the detention is unlawful. Individuals detained as suspected 
offenders or for preventive detention have the additional right to be 
tried within a reasonable time or released pending trial. These norms, 
and the existence of a supra-national jurisdiction to enforce them, 
imposed an additional layer of constraints on British counter­
terrorism measures in Northern Ireland. 
233. Investigators seeking to interrogate of course can invoke one of the allowed 
purposes as the basis for detaining their target. But an allowable purpose will in turn trigger 
its own requirements. Thus, if the detention is ostensibly based on suspicion of having 
committed an offense, Article 5(1) requires that the suspicion be reasonable and subject to 
prompt review by a court. Id. at 228. 
